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In recent years income maintenance as a method of com-
bating poverty has drawn a tremendous quantity of comment, 
discussion, and debate. One of the most active income main-
tenance suggestions is the negative income tax. Proponents 
of this method of transfer-by-taxation include a large number 
of prominent economists, business leaders and government 
officials. 
A major point made in support of a negative income tax 
is the simplicity of such a program, chiefly the comparative-
ly simple method of arriving at the amount of subsidy. While 
it is quite true that this first step can be made very simple 
it is not clear that certain subsequent steps will be as 
easy. The problem dealt with in this study concerns the tim-
ing of payments--whether or not there will be over- or under-
payments, and how they might be handled. This step is often 
ignored or given only brief mention in the formulation of 
negative income tax plans. 
Definition of the Problem 
A payments mechanism must satisfy two mutually exclusive 
goals. One, the need-payment lag should ideally be reduced 
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to zero. The need-payment lag is defined as the period of 
time which elapses between proof of need by an individual or 
family and receipt of an income maintenance subsidy. 
When is need exhibited? To understand this point assume 
that each day individuals go to a market place and hire out 
their services for that day. Assume also that the wage is 
fixed at the subsistence level, and that an income mainte-
nance program exists. If one day an individual goes to the 
market and cannot sell his services he would be considered in 
need. That is, he would not expect to earn nor actually earn 
his subsistence for that day. The time which elapses until 
he receives an income maintenance subsidy would constitute 
the need-payment lag. Relaxing the assumptions, need will be 
considered proven on the day that the individual expects his 
future income to fall below the minimum income criteria. 
Why should the need-payment lag be zero? The need-
payment lag must be zero or close to zero in order to pre-
serve the negative income tax program as an income·maintenance 
program. To illustrate assume that the need-payment lag for 
the stringent example in the previous paragraph is one day. 
If the individual in question fails in his efforts to be 
hired on day one he receives no income, but will be entitled 
to an allowance. This allowance will be paid on day two. If 
he is not hired on day two the program will have maintained 
his income for that day. But what if he should work on day 
two? Can the program which allows him to collect an allow-
ance and earn income equal to the criteria (subsistence) be 
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called an income maintenance program? As stated before this 
is a stringent example but it does illustrate the importance 
of a minimum need-payment lag. 
The second goal of a payments mechanism is the elimina-
tion of over- and under-payments. over- and under-payments 
occur when the amount of the allowance paid to a recipient 
is not equal to that which should be paid. For reasons anal-
ogous to those given above over- and under-payments should be 
zero. It is income for a given period that is to be main-
tained. Underpaying an individual prevents the system from 
accomplishing the objective of operating a proper income 
maintenance program. Overpayments interfere in the same man-
ner and introduce the possibility of burdensome repayments. 
Why was it stated that the two goals were mutually ex-
clusive? To answer this question the cause of over- and 
under-payments needs to be analyzed. Income maintenance 
payments are based on income, or better still, the lack of 
income. If the period income is known with certainty the 
subsidy payment can be calculated with complete accuracy. 
This naturally eliminates the existence of over- or under-
payments. Logically, as knowledge of the period income be-
comes less certain the probability and the occurrence of 
over- and under-payments increases. Certainty decreases 
when knowledge of income is based on expectations rather than 
historical data. The longer the length of time from expecta-
tion to realization the greater the unc.ertainty. Hence, when 
negative tax payments are based on expected future income 
there exists the distinct possibility of over- and under-
paymentso 
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Earlier it was stated that the exhibition of need would 
occur on the day the individual felt that his future income 
would be insufficiento Therefore, reduction of the need-
payment lag to zero would infer the incidence of over- and 
under-payments. On the other hand reducing the over- and 
under-payments to zero by basing·--the payment of subsidy on 
historical income data would preclude the elimination of the 
need-payment lag. 
From the above analysis it becomes evident that a nega-
tive income tax timing mechanism cannot attain both of its 
goals simultaneouslyo It becomes necessary to find a balance 
between these two goals which will optimize the system. The 
purpose of this thesis is to study the matters related to a 
payments mechanism and to analyze a system which would at-
tempt to present an optimal mix of the two goals. 
The previous discussion concerning the need-payment lag 
in relation to its role in an income maintenance program is 
extremely imp9rtant at this time. It would seem that if the 
negative income tax program is established for the primary 
goal of maintaining poverty level incomes the first concern 
should be with the reduction of the need-payment lag. Logic 
suggests that when income maintenance payments are needed 
some allowance, be it too small or too large, is better than 
none at allo And, on the other hand unnecessary payments to 
individuals and families who cease to qualify for allowances 
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should be eliminated quickly. Hence, this thesis will first 
strive to establish a minimum need-payment lag within re-
straints of economy and efficiency. Once established these 
lags will serve as constraints on the second phase of the 
study, the reduction of over- and under-payments. 
Specifically it is hypothesized that there is some 
change in the current tax and transfer system which, under 
conditions of a minimum need-payment lag, would reduce the 
incidence and magnitude of over- and under-payments. 
Limitations 
The timing of payments is not the only problem faced by 
proponents of negative tax system. Problems concerning the 
definition of the family unit, the definition of income, the 
proper tax rate or rates, the necessary minimum incomes, the 
reduction of the occurrence of work disincentives and the 
problem of cost and financing all await final action. Most 
of these problems interact with the problems concerning this 
thesis. Hence, certain assumptions must be made about them. 
The definitions of income and of the family unit are of 
critical importance to the negative income tax mechanism. 
Because they are beyond the scope of this thesis these defi-
nitions will be assumed to be established. For purposes of 
this study it is not necessary to define them explicitly. 
Where possible mention is made of the affect that different 
definitions would have on the timing problemo 
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Work incentives will be ignored as the topic is too 
broad to mention except in passing. Discussion of costs will 
be limited to using expense as a restraint to prevent the use 
of procedures which would produce unreasonable costs. Nega-
tive income tax rates and guaranteed incomes will be dis-
cussed in Chapter IIo 
Methodology 
There is only one active negative income tax program. 
This program is an experiment operated by the Office for 
Economic Opportunity through the Council for Grants to Fam-
ilies in New Jersey {hereinafter abbreviated CGF). The pro-
gram is very new and the timing mechanism is designed for 
experimental purposes. The main purpose of the experiment 
is to study work incentives and negative taxes as income 
maintenance plans and not to study payments mechanisms. 
Hence, at the present time there is no hard data available 
for studyo Instead the present income support institutions 
must be drawn upon to supply examples and data. In addition 
examples of possible negative income tax cases will be 
studiedo 
The study related to the need-payment lag will general-
ly be based on current operating procedures and methods of 
the Social Security Administration {hereinafter abbreviated 
SSA), the Public Assistance organizations and other income 
maintenance institutionso 
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The over- and under-payments situation is to a certain 
degree quantifiable. At least it is subject to definition in 
algebraic formulae. Hence, this method will be used to 
analyze the over- and under-payment problem. Evaluation of 
the results of the analysis will be conducted through the 
use of examples. 
Specifically Chapter II will review negative tax plans. 
After certain helpful definitions are established some im-
plications and ideas concerning administration will be dis-
cussed. Chapter III will establish the procedural and 
administrative framework for a proposed timing schema. 
Chapter IV will analyze the over- and under-payment problem. 
Chapter V will evaluate and discuss ideas fostered throughout 
the thesiso Chapter VI will summarize the results, make 
recommendations and suggest further research. 
CHAPTER II 
SOME THOUGHTS ON THE TIMING PROBLEM 
Before initiating a detailed discussion of the type of 
payment mechanism that would most effectively optimize the 
timing goals several questions must be studied. First, be-
cause of the multitude of transfer-by-taxation proposals a 
review of the properties of the type of plan to be studied is 
in order. Secondly, some thoughts on organization concerning 
what type of information is needed from the recipient and who 
should administer the various functions of a negative tax 
system need to be analyzed. Finally, using the more specific 
plans as guides, the timing problem should be studied and 
some of the more obvious misunderstandings should be examined. 
Negative Income Tax Proposals 
In the relatively short history of negative income tax 
dialogue there have been numerous proposals brought forward. 
Witness the work by Professor George H. Hildebrand, Poverty, 
Income Maintenance, and the Negative Income Tax, which as 
early as April of 1967 listed nine separate transfer-by-
taxation plans. 1 Since time has passed and the discussion of 
lGeorge H. Hildebrand, Poverty, Income Maintenance, and 
the Ne~ative Income Tax (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Univer=-
sity, 967), pp. 65-~ 
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negative taxes has if anything increased there exists a multi-
tude of plans ranging from extremely modest ideas to very 
large income redistribution schemes. Because of this wealth 
of literature it would be well to organize and outline the 
main existing plans and to specify the type of plan which 
will be considered in this paper. 
Similarities 
All transfer-by-taxation plans incorporate three basic 
variables. Professor Christopher Green aptly summarizes them 
in the following way: 
(1) a guaranteed minimum level of income that 
varies with family size or family composition or 
both; (2) a tax rate or rates applied against a 
tax base; and (3) a breakeven level of income where 
the tax liability equals the allowance guarantee. 
Any two of these variables determines the outcome 
of the third.2 
Differences among the various plans occur in the choice of 
values for these variables. These choices can affect the.:titn.-
ing problem. For instance, if the proponent of a plan wishes 
to establish a high minimum income and yet feels the need for 
a relatively low breakeven point in order to maximize the 
number of net taxpayers the resulting tax rate must be very 
high. Such a situation would lead logically to larger over-
and under-payments. Conversely if there were a low rate and 
low breakeven point there would necessarily be a low guaran-
teed income. This would mean that over- and under-payments 
2christopher Green, Negative Taxes and the Poverty 
Problem (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967), 
p. 62. 
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would tend to be absolutely smaller and the timing problem 
would become relatively less important. But the plan would 
be less adequate in dealing.with the poverty problem. 
There are other areas of similarity between various 
plans. Most plans call for the abolition of the stringent 
means tests employed by current welfare agencies. Proponents 
substitute instead income or the lack of it as the only cri-
teria for receipt of payment. Also a marginal tax rate of 
less than 100% is included to encourage work incentive. In 
addition to differences in the choice of variables, the plans 
have other differences which will be dealt with in the next 
two sections. Discrepancies among the various types of plans 
will be delineated and in some cases reconciled. 
EX-MSD and Poverty Ga£ Plans 
. The original negative income tax proposal was presented 
by Professor Milton Friedman in 1962. Programs similar to 
transfer-by-taxati.on plans, however, can be found as early as 
1795 when the Engli.sh used the Speenhamland system for a 
short time. 3 Mere recently Lady Juliette Evangeline Rhys-
Williams developed the Social Dividend approach to income 
maintenance. This occurred in 1942. 4 In Friedman's plan the 
tax unitvs exemptions and minimum standard deductions (here-
inafter referred to as EX-MSD), as defined by internal rev-
enue laws, are subtracted from gross income leaving adjusted 
3Ibid., p. 51. 
4Ibid. 9 p. 52. 
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income. If this amount is positive the unit will pay the 
normal positive tax for their income. If this amount is neg-
ative, however, a certain proportion is remitted to the fam-
ily as a net transfer. The total EX-MSD owing an individual 
or family is then the breakeven level of income and the pro-
portion of the negative adjusted income remitted is the neg-
ative tax rate or rates. 5 The EX-MSD could also be used as 
the income guarantee. This arrangement would call for a 
relatively high breakeven level of income. 
The poverty gap proposals use as their criteria amounts 
similar but not identical to EX-MSD. These plans establish 
guidelines for income. Individuals or families falling short 
of these guidelines are considered poor. The poverty gap 
guidelines are then used as breakeven levels or guaranteed 
incomes. 
The guidelines vary depending upon what data are used. 
A widely accepted authority is the Social Security Administra-
tion. Recent statistics published by Mollie Orshansky for 
the SSA indicate that the guidelines for a non-farm family 
should be approximately $1650 for an individual or head of 
household and $550 for each additional family member. 6 When 
5Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1962), pP:-191-195. 
6These estimates are this writer's own approximations of 
those published by Mrs. Orshansky. Her estimates are detailed 
down to the dollar and additional amounts vary with each fam-
ily member. Such detail was deemed unnecessary for present 
purpose~. Exac~ estimate~ can be found in Mollie Orshansky, 
"The Shape of Poverty in 1966," Social Security Bulletin, 31 
(M~rch, 1968), Table 1, p. 4 ... 
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comparing these figures with EX-MSD which total $900 for an 
individual or head of household and $700 for each additional 
family member the specific differences between the plans be-
come apparent. Except for relatively large families, six or 
more members, the EX-MSD approach falls short of the poverty 
criterion. The differences are extremely critical for very 
small units of one or two members. 
It is logical to assume that an initial attempt at 
transfer-by-taxation would be relatively modest. A fraction-
al plan using EX-MSD or poverty guidelines as breakeven lev-
els is the most likely candidate for an introductory plan. 
Which plan will be used, if any, depends on Congress. Good 
arguments can be advanced for both proposals. For analytical 
purposes, however, a strong case can be made for the use of 
EX-MSD in this paper 0 As stated earlier poverty guidelines 
are not well defined and in fact depend upon what data are 
used and what individual or group uses the data to arrive at 
poverty estimates. The EX-MSD on the other hand are defined 
precisely. Secondly, if a poverty gap plan were used some 
individuals or small families could simultaneously be subject 
to income taxes while receiving a subsidy for the lack of in-
come. This phenomenon is caused by the differences between 
poverty guidelines and EX-MSD. Therefore, for reasons of 
simplicity only, this paper, except where noted, will use a 
fractional EX-MSD plan. 
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Social Dividend and Other Plans 
Social Dividend plans were first suggested by Lady Rhys-
Williamso Later work was done by Robert Shultz and by D. B. 
Smith, who actually formulated a complete social dividend 
type of plan. 7 In general these programs call for the pay-
ment of a given sum to every family rich or poor. The plans 
usually include a separate tax structure which independently 
finances the schemeo The net effects of such plans are: 
one, to put a floor on income, usually at a relatively high 
level; and two, to cause a sizable redistribution of incomeo 
This author feels that the Social Dividend type of plan 
is far too ambitious to be the initial transfer-by-taxation 
program. Therefore, in the formulation of a payments mechan-
ism Social Dividend plans will largely be ignored. Suffice 
it to say that since every individual or family would receive 
a fixed payment the timing problem would become solely a 
question of recovery of earned income in relation to the tax 
structure through some withholding scheme. 
Several other plans which cannot be fitted neatly into 
one of the above mentioned categories have also been sug-
gestedo Among these are expanded public assistance and 
social insurance, and family or childrens' allowances. There 
are good possibilities that such programs may be enacted. 
However, to consider them here would excessively broaden the 
intended scope of this paper as each has its own peculiar 
7Do B. Smith, "A Simplified Approach to Social Welfare," 
Canadian Tax Journal, Volo 13 (May-June, 1965), p. 2600 . 
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and largely undefined timing problems. For instance, Chil-
dren's allowance proposals vary as to whether they would 
affect all children or just children in poor families. 
Should parental income be considered the issue would become 
more complicated. 
Sunnnary 
Social dividend, family allowances, and other fringe 
I t' ,. 
plans have largely been eliminated from the discussion.- An 
analysis of the EX-MSD type plans and the poverty gap plans 
have shown similarities and differences. Because of analytic 
simplicity it was decided to use the EX-MSD approach as a 
basic plan for study of the timing problem. This does 
not p r e c 1 u d e the use of a poverty gap plan nor would 
the more general principles set forth in this paper be af-
fected by changes in EX-MSD itself. In fact adjustment of 




All plans require some form of income declaration. This 
calls for the individual or family concerned to file, with 
the appropriate agency, a statement of their past or future 
estimated earnings. These reports can be of two types--ex 
·r 
ant~ and ex post. Ex ant~ statements are an estimate of 
future income and ex post reports are assertions of past 
.. 
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earnings. No plan could function solely on an ex ante state-
ment. Obviously there would be a complete breakdown in any 
such scheme, as virtually everyone would claim that they were 
expecting no income. On the other hand a plan could operate 
on an ex post statement, but the lag time between the evi-
dence of need and payment of subsidy would necessarily be at 
least the length of the period covered by the statement. As 
indicated in Chapter I it is the need-payment lag which must 
be reduced to a reasonable minimum in order to provide ade-
quate, timely assistance . 
Since neither type of statement is truly sufficient on 
its own, both statements should be used. An ex ante state-
ment in order to secure timely poverty relief and an ex post 
statement to insure accuracy and efficiency are both neces-
sary under a negative tax scheme oriented to the goals given 
in Chapter I. 
Most writers feel that such statements should be as 
"simple as possible. 118 This writer agrees entirely with this 
sentiment. There are, however, two sides to the coin. One 
can see that the simpler the income declaration is (i.e., the 
less detail given and the less proof required) the fewer the 
errors and omissions, and the faster an income maintenance 
program could operate. At the same time a simple statement 
would mean that it would be easier to defraud the system. 
The degree of simplicity attained under reasonable restraints 
8 Friedman, p. 192; Green, Negative Taxes, p. 112; 
Hildebrand, Poverty, p. 59. 
is dependent more on tne definition of income than on the 
design of a fonno 
Institutions 
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The Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter abbreviated 
IRS) is often tagged with the responsibility of administering 
a negative income tax with little or no discussion. 9 It is 
not readily apparent that the IRS is the institution most 
capable of the efficient transfer of money to the pooro An 
evaluation of the IRS, the Social Security Administration, 
the Public Assistance system~ and other possible administra-
tors will be helpful in the discussion of a payments mechan-
ism. Particular emphasis will be directed t,c.e those procedures 
. employed by the various instituti~ns which could conceivably 
affect the ti.ming problemo 
Internal Revenue Service 
Because sc,1 many negative inc,ome tax proponents off 
handedly accept the IRS as the administrative agency is in-
sufficient reason to assume it would be'the most efficient 
organizationo To be sure the IRS does have several plus 
factors which must be considered. One argument advanced is 
that the negative income tax would be an extension of the 
tax structure, a transfer-by-taxation system, and the IRS 
administers the tax programo Secondly, a negative income 
9Friedman, p,. 192; Green, Ne,ative Taxes, p. 110; R~on 
Society, filEo~ Forum, (April, l9 7) as reprinted in U0S 0, 
Congress 9 House, 90th Cong., 1st Sesso, May 4, 1967, Congres-
sional Record, H5O98-H51O2o 
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tax scheme to aid the poor only would cover about 10.9 mil-
lion households. 10 While an absolutely large figure, should 
the IRS handle the system, this would amount to a relatively 
small increase, approximately eleven per cent, in the number 
of income returns filed. 11 Thirdly, the IRS has manpower and 
procedures geared to the enforcement and interpretation of 
tax laws. This knowledge would be invaluable in a negative 
tax plan to prevent fraud, and interpret definitions of fam-
ily unit and income. Finally, and most important, the IRS is 
the only federal organization with power to tax income at the 
source. A method of withholding similar to or incorporated 
into the current system would be beneficial in eliminating 
the burden of overpayments. 
On the other side of the balance sheet liabilities also 
appear. While as indicated above the increase in income 
statements would be relatively small this does not take into 
account the issuance of periodic payments. This point leads 
to another problem. The IRS is organized, s,xcept for refunds, 
to be a collection not a dispersal agency. A shift of con-
cept while still retaining perspective in both collection and 
dispersal may well prove to be a difficult task. The IRS is 
also rather removed from the proximity of poverty. Only 
10
orshansky, Table 4, p .. 7. This figure is generally 
related to a fractional poverty gap plan but would be reason-
ably close, certainly a maximum, for a fractional EX...-MSD plan. 
11William H. Smith, Deputy Cotmnissioner of the Internal 
Revenue, Speech before National Convention of Former Special 
Agents of the FBI, Wash. D. c., September 29, 1967. 
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fifty-eight district offices would be available for use by 
recipients, who most probably would need more assistance in 
filing forms than the current tax payers. Intuitively it 
seems that recipients will be less likely to file revised in-
come statements should their income change if the filing of-
fice is relatively inaccessible. This would result directly 
in an increase in the probability of overpayments. Lastly, 
the IRS, being the type of agency it must be, may not be able 
to convey an image of aid and relief to the poverty stricken. 
IRS employees are not social workers. This situation could 
lead to a lack of needed personal interaction with the poor. 
Public Assistance 
Arguments can be advanced for the administration of a· 
negative income tax program by the public assistance organi-
zations. This is based chiefly on the similarity of goals. 
Public welfare agencies are quite used to dealing with the 
indigent. Their main goal is maintenance of income forcer-
tain categories of the poor. For the most part formal public 
assistance organization reaches to the county level and into 
depressed economic areas. In other words the s_;y.at~t·,is st:-rua.~.: 
tured both to aid and to reach the poor. Finally, unless the 
highly unlikely possibility that a negative income tax would 
be very generous and replace all public assistance pro-
grams, 12 there would have to be a great degree of coordination 
12Public assistance would most certainly have to con-
tinue. For instance, a couple with no income would receive 
$1440 a year from Oklahoma Old Age Assistance. Under a 
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between the two income maintenance structureso 13 In fact, 
in 1966, 2o9 million households received public assistance 
payments. Most of these 2o9 million fall into the 10.9 mil-
lion poor households mentioned earliero 14 Incorporating the 
two programs would automatically overlap and coordinate much 
of the system. 
The major argument against incorporating negative in-
come tax into the assistance programs is the lack of uniform-
ity within the public welfare sectoro A negative income tax 
scheme is designed to be national in scope and organization, 
operating in all states with the same procedures and policies 0. 
Public Assistance on the other hand is organized on a state 
level. While there are similarities and federal guidelines 
which direct state programs it would be impossible to find 
two identical state programso Because of the decentralized 
nature of the system, the increasing mobility of the poor 
would create serious problemso Moving from state to state 
would entail closing records and possible repayment of sub-
sidies in one state coupled with the necessary delay of 
processing and issuance of payment in the new state. Such 
movement would cause instability in the flow of payments and 
fifty percent EX-MSD system they would receive only $800 and 
a poverty gap plan would only increase this amount to $11000 
Dale Mitchell, Director of the Division of Research and 
Statistics, Department of Public Welfare, State of Oklahoma, 
Private Interview, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, November22,.196·~~-. 
13 Green, Negative Taxes, p. 1120 
14
orshansky, Table 19, Po 280 
would tend to create extensive over- and under-payment 
problems. 
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Overpayments themselves constitute another problem. A 
federal policy released about a year ago is important to this 
discussion. Mr. OWen B. Ash explained the policy in a le~ter·.-.·_ · 
The policy among other things precluded States 
from reducing current assistance payments to recip-
ients who had received income in the past and failed 
to report it unless the income was still available 
to the recipient (an exception was made if fraud 
was involved).15 
In other words overpayments are generally ignored. As a gen-
eral policy this would not be permitted under a negative tax 
system. Nonrepayment of certain overpayments should not be 
ruled out completely. There will be small amounts which 
would cost more to collect than to ignore. The basis for de-
ciding what overpayments to collect will have to be made from 
a marginal cost versus marginal revenue analysis. Also there 
~ 
may be some cases where collection of an overpayment would 
interfere with the major goal of a negative tax system, in-
come maintenance. In these cases it would be best to waive 
recovery of the overpayment. 
Social Security Administration 
The Social Security Administration has the definite ad-
vantage of being a national organization with some 800 per-
manent offices. In addition there are 3300 contact stations 
15 Owen B. Ash~ Letter from Mr. OWen B. Ash, Chief, Fis-
cal Standards Branch, Assistance Payments Administration, 
Washington, D.C., to Dr. Joseph J. Klos, Professor of Econom-
ics, Oklahoma State University 1 January 22, 1969. 
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in areas detached from a full time location. 16 While not 
always to the county level these centers are sufficient in 
number to be within close proximity of most poor. The ad-
ministration is chiefly a dispersal agency, issuing approxi-
mately 24 million checks a month. 17 The SSA is explicitly 
cognizant of the fact that they are a major factor in 
America's current income maintenance program and that the 
recipients of benefits are dependent upon the prompt receipt 
18 of regular monthly checks. 
Through the retirement test the SSA does make adjust-
ments in payments due to changes in income. In the same 
light the administration has procedures to effect reconcilia-
tions in over- and under-payments. In fact under certain 
circumstances overpayments may be repaid over extended per-
iods of time. 19 These same procedures include the require-
ment that individuals affected by the retirement test 
complete income statements, both ex an~~ and ex post. An 
automatic check is available on the accuracy of the ex post 
16u. s. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
Social Security Administration, Where to Get HGlp or Informa-
tion on Social Security, (Washington, IT:- er:-: overninent 
Printing Office, 1968). . 
1711current Operating Statistics," Social Security Bul-
letin, (June, 1968), Table M-8, p. 24. 
18u. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
Social Security Administration, Claims Manual, {Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), sec. 1000. 
19u. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
Social Security Administration, Social Security Handbook, 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), sec. 
1910. 
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income reports through the cooperation with the IRS and the 
SSA computer facilities. 20 These direct parallels of nega-
tive income tax ad.ministration needs provide strong arguments 
for Social Security administration of a negative tax program. 
The SSA has one major drawback. It is solely a dis-
persal oriented agency, all collections for the administra-
tion being handled by the IRS. The SSA itself has no direct 
method of taxing income at its source ~.-;; t; ,: .cj.o its operations 
include any other normal type of collection function. An-
other problem may stem from the insurance concept of current 
Social Security programs. Whether or not the direct welfare 
aspects of a negative tax would interfere with this original 
social insurance concept is not certain. 
A New Agency? 
Some consideration should be given to the establishment 
of a new agency, one which could incorporate all of the pro-
cedures which would assure an efficient operation. The ob-
vious drawback is in the duplication of efforts in relation 
to the aforementioned institutions. Any attempt to withhold 
from the source of income would conflict with and confuse the 
present IRS system. A high level of coordination and com-
munication would have to be initiated with other income main-
tenance programs. Th~ one new agency which might be suitable 
or even desirable would be a nationalized Public Assistance 
20u. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
Social Security Administration, Claims Manual, sec. 5101 (e). 
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program. Such a program has received a flourish of attention 
in the last few months. 21 
How would the federalization of Public Assistance affect 
this thesis? This writer feels that such action would not 
materially alter the conclusions of this paper. The reasons 
are quite simple. A decentralized plan similar to Governor 
Rockefeller's would be very similar to the current Public 
Assistance. The only difference would be in the financing 
of the program. If the autonomy of the state systems is 
maintained most methods and procedures related to the payment 
of subsidy would probably go unaltered. The other alterna-
tive is a complete federalization of assistance. This type 
of program would yield an administrative system resembling 
that of the Social Security Administration. Hence, national 
public assistance need not be considered as a separate type 
of administrative arrangement. Depending on one's own pref-
erences National Public Assistance can be read in for current 
Public Assistance or SSA when this paper considers procedures 
and methods related to these institutions. 
Summary 
From the previous discussion a logical choice would be 
to allow the IRS to handle the collection of overpayments and 
policing functionsj leaving all other administrative duties 
21 Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor of New York, Speech 
before the Republican Governorsv Conference, Palm Springs, 
Calif., December 6, 1968; Joseph J. Klos, 19Public Assistance 
Family Allowances, or the Negative Income Tax?," Paper pre- ' 
sented to the Rocky Mountain Social Science Association, 
Denver, Colorado, May 3, 1968, po 19. 
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to the SSA. It has been shown that this action would be the 
most efficient in light of goals. The current channels of 
communication between the IRS and the SSA are geared to this 
type of organization. The IRS currently collects all OASDHI 
contributions and transfers them to the SSA accounts at the 
Treasury. The addition of negative income tax overpayment 
collections would not seriously affect this process. 22 For 
these reasons the rest of this paper will orient itself 
towards a system administered in this manner. This is not to 
say that Public Assistance will be ignored. Principles and 
procedures applied by these institutions may well shed much 
light on the timing problem, and the necessity of close co-
operation between public assistance and the negative income 
tax program cannot be overstated. 
Critique of Specific Proposals 
Most negative income tax proposals seldom deal with the 
administrative details of the plan. However, there are fo~r 
separate sources who have developed payment mechanisms with 
some degree of detail. The rRii.pon· Society, a Republican re-
search and policy organization, has issued a detailed nega-
tive income tax proposal. The Council for Grants to Families 
a subsidiary of Mathematica is conducting a negative income 
tax experiment in New Jersey. Representative William Ryan,. 
22Arnie Johnson, Staff Assistant to the District Direc-
tor, Internal Revenue Service, Private Interview, Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma, Nov. 28, 1968. 
25 
(D. N.Y.), has submitted a bill in congress cited as the 
"Income Maintenance Act." And, a plan was presented sepa-
rately by Joseph A. Pechman and James Tobin to the Subcommit-
tee on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Committee in June 
of 1968. 23 Their ideas stem from an article written by 
Pechman, Tobin, and Peter M. Mieszkowski in 1967. It is the 
statements in this article which will be analyzed. 24 An 
analysis of the timing mechanisms of these plans would be 
helpful in understanding current thought on methods of pay-
ment, and expose some deceptive points in relation to the 
alleged simplicity of the negative income tax idea. 
"Rir,o)!. Proposal 
3. Administration 
One of the fundamental simplicities of the Neg-
ative Income tax is the ease with which the program 
can be administered without establishing an addi-
tional welfare bureaucracy. An individual or fami-
ly which expects its income to fall below the 
standard in a future period will file for Negative 
Income Tax payments from the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice. These payments will be made monthly. At the 
end of each year, Negative Tax recipients will file 
returns showing their actual income in the year. 
Any discrepancy between the actual Negative Tax pay-
ments and what a family was entitled to can be made 
up by a lump sum refund or tax payment, or if the 
payment is large, by a tax payment spread over 
several months. 
To minimize the variation in tax payments [by 
the] employed, Negative.Tax recipients should have 
... 
23 U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Connnittee, Income Main-
tenance Programs, before the subcommittee on Fiscal Policy, 
90th Cong., 2nd sess., 1968, pp. 93-103, 244-273. 
24James Tobin, Joseph A. Pechman, and Peter M. Mieszkow-
ski, "Is a Negative Income Tax Practical?," The Yale Law 
Journal, 77 (November, 1967), pp. 20-23. - -
tax withheld at the source like other employees. 
Withholding together with assistance in filling out 
forms and modern data processing, will simplify the 
administration problems in adjusting tax payments 
to income.25 
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The preceding is the section of the Ripon proposal pertain-
ing directly to administration and the timing of payments. 
While not explicitly detailed the statement does show where 
the more refined thoughts of the authors will lead. The in-
clusion of monthly payments, ex anti and ex post income 
declarations, and some use of the withholding tax structure 
is the lo.gical beginning of a well organized timing schema. 
The main area of contention centers on the over- and 
under-payments mechanism. The Society seems to draw the con-
clusion that excessive over- and under-payments necessitating 
relatively large transfers of money will be quantitatively 
insignificant. At the same time the impression is left that 
the Rippon Society feels that income changes during the year 
will also be inconsequential and, therefore, reaction to 
these changes are ignored. Coupling these two points with 
the opening statement concerning simplicity leads this writer 
to believe that simplicity is either assumed or is given too 
high a priority in the proposal. Intuitively it can be seen 
that the simpler the timing mechanism the larger and more 
frequent the occurrence of over- and under-payments. In 
order to provide adequate and regular assistance in line with 
the neea··exhibited by the lack of income it is necessary that 
25
congressional Record, p. H5102. 
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changes in income and procedures to minimize over- and under-
payments must be taken into accounto To do these things a 
more complicated schema must be developedo 
New Jersey Experiment 
The CGF is engaged in an experimental program and has 
therefore designed its system for controlled statistical 
study. For this reason recipients must report their income 
every four weeks, and payments are made on the basis of 
these ex post statements. 26 Because of the size of the pro-
gram and the frequency of reporting the use of ex post decla:=-
rations does not significantly interfere with the need-
payment lag. The use of ex post statements eliminates any 
over- or under-payment problem. 
The :~;Ki-pom. report sacrificed accurate, regular, adequate 
assistance for simplicity of administration. A practicing 
plan incorporating concepts used by the CGF would sacrifice 
any semblance of economy of administration for extensive 
control of proper payments. That is, in order to keep up the 
pace and narrow the need-payment lag of a CGF type proposal 
the administering agency would have to be a tremendously 
large establishment. This analysis holds for the type of 
scheme involved~ This does not imply that the CGF supports 
such a plan for a practicing negative tax system. 
26Heather Ross, ''An Experimental Study of the Negative 
Income Tax," Paper presented at the second annual meeting of 
the Connnunity Services of Pennsylvania, Harrisburg, Pa., 
May 19, 1968, p. 4. 
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The Ryan Bill 
Representative Ryan's proposal is not explicitly labeled 
"negative income tax," but the provisions are characteristic 
of such a plan. The guaranteed income is equal to two-thirds 
of the monthly EX-MSD with a ceiling of $284 per family. In 
other words the program only covers six or less dependents. 
The negative income tax rate is fifty percent. There are 
special rules which apply to married couples, residents of 
rural areas, Public Assistance recipients, and Social Securi-
ty beneficiaries. Due to space limitations these groups will 
be ignored. 
The unusual aspect of Mr. Ryan's bill is the reliance 
on the month as the central time period with the year used 
as a restraint. The subchapter on Administration states: 
"Sec. 1611. Regulations. 
"The Secretary may prescribe such regulations 
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of 
this chapter. 
"Sec. 1612. Application for Benefits. 
"An eligible individual may apply for an in-
come maintenance benefit under section 1602 for a 
month at such time and in such manner as the Secre-
tary or his delegate shall prescribe by regulation. 
Such regulations may provide that an eligible in-
dividual may apply for benefits for more than one 
month in a single application. Two or more eligible 
individuals may apply jointly for benefits to which 
each is entitled. 
"Sec. 1613. Payment of Benefits. 
"At such time as may be prescribed by regula-
tions, but not later than 180 days after the close 
of each month, the Secretary or his delegate shall 
pay an income maintenance benefit to each eligible 
individual entitled to receive such a benefit under 
section 1602 for such month, .... 
"Sec. 1614. Procedure and Enforcement . 
. 
"(c) Collection of Overpayments.--!£ an indi-
vidual receives any payment under this chapter to 
which he is not entitled or which is in excess of 
the amount to which he is entitled under section 
1602, the Secretary or his delegate may recover 
such payment or the amount of such excess only by 
withholding it from subsequent income maintenance 
benefits to which such individual is entitled under 
this chapter. 1127 
While the above sections illustrate the importance of 
the month, section 1605 shows the use of the year. 
"Sec. 1605. Imposition of Tax on Excess Annual 
Income. 
"(a) Net Annual Income Defined.--For purposes 
of this section, the tenn 'excess annual income' 
means (1) the income of an individual during the 
taxable year plus the income for each calendar 
month which ends in such taxable year of any other 
individual who is an eligible dependent of such 
eligible individual for such calendar month, less 
(2) 150 percent of the sum of the minimum standard 
deduction (whether or not such individual computes 
his tax under chapter 1 on the basis of such de-
duction) plus any exemptions to which such indi-
vidual is entitled under section 151. 
"{b) Imposition of Tax.--If for any calendar 
month ending in the taxable year an individual re-
ceives an income maintenance benefit, and such 
individual has excess annual income, then in ad-
dition to any tax imposed on such individual under 
section 1 for such taxable year, there is imposed 
on such individual a tax equal to the lesser of--
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"(1) one-half of the excess annual in-
come of such individual for such taxable 
year, or 
"(2) the aggregate amount of income 
maintenance benefits paid to such individual 
during such taxable year. 1128 
R.R. 17331, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., secs. 1611, 1612, 
1613, and 1614(c) (1968)0 
28 Ib1.·do, 1605 sec. . 
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Note that the monthly and annual breakeven levels of in-
come are different. A family of four would have a monthly 
guarantee of $167 and a breakeven income level of $334. An-
nualized the $334 would be $4008. The annual breakeven point 
as described in section 1605 is $4500. In other words an 
individual could conceivably receive excess income in some 
months and still be allowed to keep all of the subsidy paid 
in other months. 
Implied in the bill is the use of monthly ex post income 
statements. However, the language of the bill is liberal 
enough to allow the Secretary of the Treasury to establish 
ex anti procedures. The implication of ex post statements 
is drawn from the paragraph covering overpayments. Mr. Ryan, 
obviously does not anticipate a large number of significant 
overpayments, due to the use of ex post statements. This 
creates a dilemma. This chapter and the previous one com-
bined to illustrate the dangers in using ex post statements. 
They also indicated the occurrence of overpayments when 
statements of expected income are used. The solution is 
relatively simple. Chapter IV will present ways to recover 
overpayments created by the use of ex anti statements. The 
dilemma does illustrate one more trap into which a negative 
income tax proponent can fall. 
It seems appropriate to make connnent on some of the more 
unusual aspects of Mr. Ryan's bill. The differences between 
the monthly and annual breakeven points is seen as an imagi-
native idea which deserves further economic development. 
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The introduction of the special handling of rural and other 
groups has drawn theoretical attention, but to this writer's 
knowledge Mr. Ryan has written the first concrete plan to 
deal with these situations. Finally, the bill creates a 
Bureau of Income Maintenance under the Secretary of the 
Treasury. 29 Earlier discussions in this chapter indicate 
that such action may not be the most efficient course 
available. 
The Tobin, Pechman, Mieszkowski Plan 
The Tobin, Pechman, Mieszkowski negative tax plan ac-
tually develops two methods of payment . 
. . . : (1) automatic payments of full basic 
allowances to all families, except those who waive 
payments in order to avoid withholding of the off-
setting tax on other earnings; (2) payment of net 
benefits upon the execution of a declaration of 
estimated income, .... 30 
The first method of payment introduces an idea analogous 
to the Social Dividend Plan. There are two drawbacks to this 
method of payment. One, as the authors suggest it may well 
be difficult to convince the average man that this is not 
some wild give away program where money is paid to everyone, 
including the rich. 31 Secondly, their analysis does not 
take into account changes in income, and their affect on 
over- and under-payments. 
29 Ibid., sec. 4. 
30Tobin, Pechman, and Mieszkowski, p. 21. 
31Ibid., p. 22. 
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This is the same shortcoming found in method two. Tobin, 
Pechman, and Mieszkowski implicitly hold the same philosophy 
toward overpayments as the Rippon Society. That is, over-
payments will not constitute a serious problem. 32 The exam-
ples delineated in Chapter Vindicate that this theory 
concerning overpayments is most probably inaccurate. It is 
felt that either of the two methods developed by Tobin, 
Pechman, and Mieszkowski would function as a negative tax 
payments mechanism if the ideas developed in this thesis, 
especially those from Chapter IV and V, were incorporated 
into the plans. 
Sunnnary 
In order to achieve a well organizedj efficient negative 
income tax program it is necessary to achieve a balance be-
tween what tend to be mutually exclusive goals. The first 
two systems illustrate this point. A negative income tax is 
not as simple to administer as it first appears, nor is it 
absolutely certain that it will be more efficient or econom-
ical than current income maintenance programs. The second 
two examples help to illustrate the lack of goal orientation 
in some negative tax plans. The problems associated with the 
need-payment lag and over- and under-payments cannot be dis-
regarded or underrated. 
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Swmnary 
This chapter has attempted to lay a foundation upon 
which a framework for a payments schema can be built. The 
framework will be affected by the type of plan as well as the 
type of administration. The chapter has argued that an EX-
MSD plan administered by the SSA and policed by the IRS is 
the most feasible and efficient combination available. This 
type of organization also offers a simpler, clearer picture 
for analyzing the timing problem. Therefore, these ideas 
will be the basic foundation for the timing study. 
CHAPTER III 
PROPOSED ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK 
Chapter II has formulized a base on which to build a 
timing framework. Chapter III will develop the administra-
tive part of that framework. The various functions that an 
administration would have to carry on are analyzedo The func-
tions are processing, policing, and payment. A general de-
scription of the procedures employed in each function will 
be given. 
Processing Function 
Processing a new applicant and reflecting changes in a 
recipient's status are integral problems in a timing mechan-
ismo As indicated this function can be divided into two seg-
ments, initial processing for the new applicant and periodic 
review and special processing for the current recipient. Re-
duction of the timing problem depends upon the efficient op-
eration of both segments of this functiono The ibitial 
processing is critical to the minimization of the need-
payment lago The effective review and special handling of 
current cases is likewise necessary to minimize over- and 
under-paymentso 1 
1There will be some cross effectso That is, initial 
processing will affect over- and under-payments as reviewing 
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The initial processing under a negative income tax sys-
tem would necessitate: one, the filing of an expected income 
statement; two, a review and examination of that statement; 
three, the processing of the statement and the initiation of 
certain required records; and four, the issuance of a check. 
The first two steps are relatively simple. The expected in-
come statement reflects the beliefs of the recipient with re-
gard to his future income. He alone would know what his 
income should be. Furthermore, only future expected income 
is considered, hence, the agency must accept the statement at 
its face value. Step two would be limited to checking for 
accuracy and prevention of overt fraud. 
The third step is more complicated. First records must 
be opened and the individual or family identified in some 
orderly fashion. Additional information necessary to the 
operation of the negative tax system would be required. The 
exact nature of this information cannot be determined until 
the definitions of taxable family unit and income are deter-
mined. Other corollary information would most probably be 
entered into the file. Such information as job qualifica-
tions, aptitudes, and the like could be used in a program of 
interagency coordination of job placement and social services.· 
Finally, the income statement would be filed and arranged to 
be updated and verified periodically or when the need arises. 
will affect the need-payment lag. However, these relation-
ships are relatively less important than those mentioned in 
the text. 
The fourth function, payment, will be dealt with in detail 
below. 
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Periodic processing is necessary to minimize over- and 
under-payments and to insure adequate timely payments. Peri-
odic processing should be divided into separate types. One 
is routine processing. This would verify original and re-
vised data and prevent incorrect information from affecting 
a recipient's payments indefinitely. The first need is an 
ex post income report. Periodic refiling of ex ante income 
statements is also necessary. In order to promote efficiency 
it is suggested that these statements be filed together. One 
could not hope that these reports would be filed on January 1 
if they are filed together. The best solution would be to 
have the recipient file the ex ante statement with the ex 
post report on or before April 15. While the ex ant~ report 
would be belated, benefits would be accrued through the elim-
ination of double filing. Most problems caused by late fil-
ing could be eliminated if the recipients are made aware of 
the importance of the second type of periodic processing. 
Special processing would be needed should a change oc-
cur in the family unit's makeup, expected future income, the 
realization of expected income, or any other relevant varia-
ble. Prompt action must be taken at all times on such 
changes. If the recipients are made to realize the impor-
tance of reporting such changes, especially when they would 
tend to reduce payments, serious over- and under-payment 
problems could be avoided. 
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If the general rules laid out above are followed and the 
information kept simple enough few problems not already being 
handled by such agencies as the SSA and the Bureau of Public 
Assistance will occur. The simplicity mentioned is in the 
ease of filing data of all types mentioned with the adminis-
trator. Chiefly the income statement is of concern. Toil-
lustrate this point the SSA income estimate form is part of 
the ex post report. The form is a computer punch card which 
asks two simple questions concerning future income: "a. Show 
your expected total earnings for 1968 o •• " and "b. Are you 
now EITHER working as an employee OR performing substantial 
services in selfemployment?" The ex post statement is also 
simple asking only that the individual list his past year's 
income. Obviously, such a form is easy to handle and in-
volves minimal problems. On the other hand should welfare 
assistance, OASDHI payments, or other presently non-taxable 
items be included in the definition of income the processing 
problems begin to multiply. Next the two more concrete 
functions of policing and payments will be duscussed. 
Policing Function 
Policing of a negative tax system is an absolute must. 
If cheating and fraud are overtly permitted the system will 
collapse. A negative income tax timing mechanism should try 
to emulate and where possible improve on the current self-
assessment positive tax system. This is not to imply that 
all individuals will attempt to cheat should they have the 
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opportunity nor is this to say that some individuals will re-
frain from fraud no matter how stringent the policing. A 
balance must be found to ensure efficient, just operation of 
a negative tax scheme without allowing the policing to become 
too costly or unnecessarily oppressive and suspicious. 
The basis for payment under the negative tax is the ex 
anti income statement. This report is taken solely on the 
word of the recipient. The SSA relies on the same sort of 
information. It finds that: 
To learn of the occurrence of events that af-
fect continuing eligibility, the Administration re-
lies primarily on reports by the beneficiaries 
themselves, and experience thus far shows that 
overall this works out well.2 
The SSA does run routine checks on the ex post reports. The 
process is described thusly: 
After annual reports have been processed for a spe-
cific year, the Administration makes a routine check 
to detennine how effectively beneficiaries have com-
plied with reporting requirements. This process 
consists of a comparison between total earnings on 
the annual report submitted by the beneficiary, and 
total earnings reported on tax returns to BDPA 
[Bureau of Data Processing and Accounts] by him or 
by his employer. If the comparison indicates pos-
sible ommissions on the annual report that would af-
fect deductions, development is made to determine 
the exact earnings for the year and, where appropri-
ate, the monthly services performed.3 
The IRS uses the same type of general check on tax re-
turns. Either agency could run this original check, and in-
itiate further inquiries if necessary. Two problems prevent 
2
u .. s., Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
Social Security Administrati0n, Claims Manual, sec. 5000. 
3
rbid .. , sec. 5101 (e). 
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this automatic check from being universal. One, while most 
workers (employed and self-employed) are taxable under OASDHI 
and/or withholding there are small groups which do not have 
to report. Secondly, since under self employment both re-
ports are originated by the same individual the automatic 
checking becomes somewhat questionable. The major problem 
areas would be in agriculture and some service occupations 
notably household workers. However, these remain the excep-
tion rather than the rule. Table I sheds some light on the 
question. The categories Clerical and Sales, Craftsmen and 
Foremen, Operatives and Laborers contain over sixty per cent 
of the poor working household heads. It seems logical to as-
sume that the overwhelming majority in these groups do not 
fall under the two exceptions, workers not covered and the 
self employed. Adding to this number those in the other 
groups who are employed and covered the problem becomes less 
significant. For the exceptions the only practical answer is 
for the IRS to police them as they do tax returns. 
Payment Function 
The payment function is the most important to be con-
sidered in this paper. Basically the payment will be arrived 
at by operating on the given values of earned income, family 
size, number of payments to be made in the period, the break-
even level of income, and the negative tax rate or rates 
through a formula to arrive at a periodic payment. The prob-
lem occurs when one of the variables changes during the 
TABLE I 
INCIDENCE OF POVERTY IN 1966: EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND 
OCCUPATION OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 
Number and Percent of Families 
Total Number Poor as Per-
Heads of of % of centage 
Households Poor Total Heads Distri-
(thousands) of Hsldso bution 
Total 
Employment Status and 


































































17 .. 6 
Source: Mollie Orshansky, "The Shape of Poverty in 1966," 
Social Security Bulletin, 31 (March, 1968), 
Table 6, po 11. 
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defined period. The most likely one to change and the most 
difficult to account for is earned income. 
To consider this function in an organized manner two as-
sumptions must be made. Assume that after the negative tax 
ex ante income estimate is filed a recipient will encounter 
only one change in his expected or realized income. Assume 
also that all those who file ex ante statements will report 
such change. Note that there will be some individuals who 
will not file an ex ant~ statement and/or will not revise 
their estimates out of ignorance, fear, health, prejudice or 
other reasons. A massive publicity campaign may perhaps re-
duce the size of this group. Remaining cases will have to 
be handled individually as they come to the attention of the 
administrator. Now all possible examples can be placed into 
three categories as shown in Table II. 
TABLE II 
SUMMARY OF POSSIBLE NEGATIVE INCOME TAX CASES 





Description of Change and 
Category Characteristics 
Any decrease in revised expected income or 
realized income. Requires change in sub-
sidy. Causes underpayments. 
An increase in revised expected income or 
realized income which will not necessitate 
repayment of any previously paid subsidy. 
Requires change in subsidy. Causes over-
payments. 
An inc.r.ease. in .. r.ev.ised expe.c.t.ed .income or re-
alized income which will require the repay-
ment of all or part of previously paid sub-
sidy. Requires elimination of subsidy. 
Causes overpayments. 
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The first category is relatively simple to characterize. 
It includes all changes in a recipient's income which results 
in a realized income less than the original estimate or a 
revised expected income which i.s smaller than the original 
estimate. 
The other two categories involve changes in a recipient's 
income which causes the individual or family to expect or 
realize more than the original estimateo Category 2 includes 
all such changes which do not require repayment of subsidy. 
These changes are of relatively small magnitudeo Changes 
which fall into Category 2 always result in a realized or 
revised expected income less than the breakeven levelo 
Considering only subsidies already paid in the period 
in question Category 3 includes all increases in income 
(realized or revised expected) which demand repayment of all 
or part of that subsidy. Such changes can be large or small. 
Changes which leave realized or revised expected income below 
the breakeven level of income requires repayment of part of 
the subsidy. Changes which leave said income at or above the 
breakeven level require repayment of all of the subsidy in 
question. 
Category one is the cause of underpaymentso A smaller 
revised expected or realized income means that negative tax 
payments will have to be increased. This, of course, can be 
accomplished by an increase in the periodic payments. The-
oretically underpayments could be eliminated if: one, pay-
ments are made ex post, that is, at the end of the subperiod 
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(quarter, month, week, etc.); and two, there is no need-
payment lag. These two situations, especially the lag, will 
prevent the complete elimination of underpaymentso However, 
underpayments can be minimized by learning of decreases in 
expected income when they occur, by increasing the size of 
the periodic payments accordingly, and possibly by including 
any withholding tax payments in the increased subsidy. 4 
Categories two and three are the chief causes of over-
payments. Both of these groups require a decrease or elim-
ination of subsidy payments and in the case of Category 3 a 
repayment of subsidyo Again the need-payment lag will be a 
major factor in the occurrence of overpayments. Overpay-
ments should be recovered, as much as possible~ through a 
withholding scheme. This is the subject of discussion in 
Chapter IV. 
Other Administrative Considerations 
Ano~her administrative problem concerns the mobility of 
recipientso It is suggested that the SSA procedures be fol-
lowed in this mattero Under SSA procedures an individual 
secures a Social Security number at a local officeo The re-
quired information is gathered and fo:rwarded to one of six 
4Note that even though actual income at the end of the 
full period may be less than breakeven income (gross income 
less EX-MSD) under certain circumstances withholding may oc-
curo It can be observed that withholding schedules are based 
on time as well as earningso In other words an income paid 
over a fraction of a period will uappear" to be larger than 
it actually iso 
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regional offices. These offices are called payment offices. 
They become the permanent custodian of the individuals com-
plete file. A summary sheet is sent to any office that the 
individual becomes associated with in the futureo For 
example, a beneficiary who acquired his card in Stillwater, 
Oklahoma, would always have his permanent record in Kansas 
City, Missouri, no matter where he moved within the United 
States. Actual payments are made by the Treasury Department 
from information supplied by the payment officeso 5 A similar 
procedure could be followed in a negative income tax 
mechanism. 
Sununary 
Chapter III has attempted to illustrate the types of 
administrative functions that a negative tax system would 
have to undertake 0 In addition the chapter indicated brief-
ly the general procedures which would be required of an ef-
ficient income maintenance operationo It is important to 
understand that the payments function is the most important 
carried on by this type of poverty relief programo All other 
functions should aid the payments function in achieving the 
main goal of income maintenanceo Functions which may inter-
fere with this goal will have to be weighed carefully. Such 
procedures may be necessary for the long run success of the 
5Bill Godwin, Oklahoma City District Office, Social 
Security Administration, Private Interview, Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma, November 22, 1968. 




WITHHOLDING REVISION AND THE REDUCTION 
OF OVERPAYMENTS 
From the previous discussions it should be obvious that 
a system of withholding income at the source is important to 
the efficient functioning of a timing schemao Derivation of 
such a system will be the subject of this chaptero 
Before beginning, several assumptions must be made. 
First, only one change in expected income will be pennitted 
(that change being an increase). Secondj it is necessary for 
a recipient to be able to indicate to his employer that he 
has received negative tax payments during the year and that 
he should be subject to the special withholding rates. It is 
assumed that this is accomplished by indicating same on the 
Employeevs Withholding Exemption Certificate, the so called 
W-4 formo Third, for reasons that will become obvious later 
the negative tax rate is assumed to be greater than the cur-
rent withholding rate. This is not too restrictive consider-
ing that the withholding rate never exceeds 33% and is 
greater than 20% only when taxable income exceeds $8800 per 
year. 
The fi.nal assumption is the most importanto The need-
payment lag is assumed to be zero. This assumption is made: 
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one, for simplicity in analyzing the withholding problem; 
and two, because the exact effect of these lags on withhold-
ing is not clear. An example will help explain this second 
reason. Since all changes in expected income are increases, 
many cases will require the elimination of negative tax pay-
ments. It would seem logical that in many cases payment 
could be stopped and the need-payment lag eliminated. In 
other cases the check may not be stopped immediately. In 
other words because the lag cannot be precisely defined it 
will be assumed to be zero. 
The Model 
The General Model 
To understand what changes must be made in the withhold-
ing system it would be helpful to understand the mechanics of 
the overpayment problem. The subsidy paid an individual or 
family is a function of the breakeven level of income, the 
negative income tax rate and the individual's expected in-
come. The annual subsidy {SA) can be defined as: 
SA= r(B-E), 
where r is the negative tax rate, Bis the breakeven level 
of income and Eis the expected annual income. 1 Note that B 
is always greater than E since this equation describes a 
negative tax recipient. 
1 The rater could be a system of rates, but this would 
only tend to confuse the analysis while not adding substance. 
48 
When expected income increases the amount of subsidy 
owed to the individual or family will decrease. The new sub-
sidy which can be described as the final subsidy is defined 
as: 
(4-1) 
where b0 is a function of Band E', characterized by the fol-
lowing properties: 
bO = 1, for B>E', 
ho= O, for B~E', (4-la) 
where E' is the new expected income. Now expectation of fu-
ture income can change at any time during the year. Hence, 
some but not all of the original subsidy will have been paid. 
The amount of subsidy already paid can be written: 
Sp= (1-t)r(B-E), (4-2) 
where tis that portion of the period (year) remaining. The 
value oft has the property: 
0£t~l. 
This means that if t equals 0.25 three quarters of the origi-
nal subsidy has already been paid to the recipient, and one 
quarter, three months, of the year remains. 
The next step is to subtract the amount of subsidy that 
should be paid, SA, from the amount that has been paid, Sp. 
(4-3) 
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where b1 is a function of B, E, and ER, characterized by the 
properties: 
(4-3a) 
and where R is the amount which the recipient must return in 
order to eliminate the projected overpayment. Note that if 
R is zero this indicates that the adjustment to the change in 
expected income can be handled solely by a decrease or elim-
ination of negative tax payments. Substituting (4-1) and 
(4-2) into (4-3) yields: 
R = b1r[(l-t)(B-E)-b0(B-E')J. (4-4) 
Since R is the total projected overpayment which should 
b 11 d f h . . R h e co ecte ram t e recipient, tN represents t e amount 
which should be withheld in each pay period. The symbol N is 
the number of subperiods in each period (12, months; 52, 
weeks). Dividing both sides of (4-4) by tN yields: 
R _ b1r [ (1-t) (B-E)-bo (B-E')]. (4-S) 
'EN - tN 
Next the subperiod income should be defined. The new 
expected income is E'. The original expected income is E. 
The amount (1-t)E is that part of the original expected in-
come which has been earned up until the time expected income 
changes. The term, 
E' - (1-t)E, 
describes the amount of income earned after the change in 
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expected income. Dividing by tN the term, 
E' - (1-t)E 
tN ' 
is the recipient's subperiod income. 
Negative tax payments consider family size in payments. 
It would seem logical to include family size in subperiod in-
come. This can be done by subtracting the subperiod value of 
EX-MSD, which changes with family size from subperiod income. 
The resultant taxable subperiod income is written: 




where Xis the annual value of EX-MSD. 
Logically there should be some value, say j, which when 
multiplied by subperiod taxable income yields the amount 
which should be withheld during every subperiod, ~- This 
value can be found by dividing equation (4-5) by subperiod 
taxable income. 
j = 
This operation yields: 
b1r[(l-t)(B-E) - b0 (B-E')J 
tN 
E' - i~-t)E _ i 
tN Multiplying the right side of the equation by tN the equation 
simplifies to: 
blr[(l-t)(B-E) - bo(B-E')J 
j = E 1 - (1-t)E - tX (4-6) 
By substituting proper values for b0 two related equations 
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can be written: 
b1r[(l-t)(B-E) - b0 (B-E')] j = E' - (l-t)E - tX I 
b1r[E' - (1-t)E - tB] or j = E' (l-t)E - tX ' - (4-7) 




= E 1 - ( 1-t) E - tX ' 
b1r[B - (1-t)E - tB] or j = E' (l-t)E - tX ' - (4-8) 
for bO = O, or BfE'. Table III indicates the value of j 
relative tor under given circumstances. 
The final step in arriving at a general model is to in-
clude the operation of the current withholding system. In 
doing so a special negative tax withholding rate will be de-
veloped. This rate will be applied to negative tax recipi-
ents only. For this reason the current withholding rate and 
this new negative tax withholding rate will be separate and 
both types of withholding will be present. In an actual sys-
tem the rates may be merged for recipients, but for now this 
would only serve to cloud certain concepts rather than add to 
the analysis. 
The amount withheld over the last t part of the year is 
given by: 






RELATIONSHIP OF r AND ~ : GIVEN RELATIVE ,.--./ 
VALUES OF B, E AND X.2 
1, and bl== 1: 
B = X r = j 
B > X r > j 
B£ X r L. j 
1, and b1 = 0: 
B = X r >j = 
B>X r >j = 
BLX r :;, j = 
0, and bl= 1: 
B = X r > j 
B>X r-;;,,, j 





2The case of ho= O, and b1 = 0 was not considered be-
cause if ho= 0 then bl must be equal to one. This is true 
because Sp is always greater than zero and SA is equal to 
zero when ho= 0. See equations (4-la) and 14-3a). 
53 
where Wis the amount withheld during each subperiod, w is 
the withholding rate (or rates), and b2 is a function of E', 
E, X, and t, characterized by the properties: 
= l E' - (1-t)E "'> X, h2 for, tN ,,, N 
b2 = 0 for, E' - (1-t)E ~ X. tN N (4-9a) 
Withholding schedules are based on the assumption that 
the ratio of subperiod income to annual income is equal to 
the reciprocal of the number of subperiods. That is, if an 
individual earns $100 in a given month the withholding tax 
schedule assumes that the ratio of the $100 to total income 
is equal to 1/12, the reciprocal of the number of months. 
The individual is expected to receive $1200 of income in the 
year. For incomes with this relationship the amount withheld 
and the annual tax liability are practically equal to 
$13,000 of taxable income. 3 Because of this a problem arises 
in that formula (4-9) is based on income paid over a time 
period less than a year. Taxable subperiod income will be 
greater than needed to meet annual tax liability require-
ments. The excess withholding in each subperiod can be 
shown by: 
3u.s., Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service, 
Circular E: Emiloyer's Tax Guide (Washington, D.C.: Govern-
ment Printing O £ice, 190BT, pp. 19-21; U.S., Treasury De-
partment, Internal Revenue Service, 1968 Federal Income Tax 
Forms {Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 19oS"'f, 
p. 11. 
S4 
w = b [E' - (1-t)E _ x]- b [E' - x], 
e 2w tN R' 3w tN (4-10) 
where We is the excess withholding in each subperiod, 
[!' - X]~ w tN 
indicates the tax liability allocated to each subperiod, and 
b3 is a function of E' and X characterized by the properties: 
b3 = 1 for, E' 2 X, b 3 = 0 for, E' 4' X. 
(4-lOa) 
Subtracting We from ilrwill yield the net amount of re-
payment per subperiod needed to reduce overpayments to zero. 
This equation can be written: 
t
~ _ w • bir[<l-t)(B-e) - bn(B-E')1 
e tN J b 
rE' - ~1-t)E x~ 
2wL t- - !fJ 
+ b3w[E' tN X} 
Dividing this equation by the subperiod income yields a rate, 
k, the negative tax withholding rate. 
b r[(l-t)(B-E)-bo(B-E')]-b wr '-(1-t)E-tXJ+b w[E-X] 
k= 1 tN 2 tN 3 tN9 
E' - ci-t>E - tX 
t 
Multiplying by~; and simplifying leaves: 




4this term holds for (E'-X) IE $13,000. To discuss tax-
able income in excess of $13,000 seems to be unnecessary in 
view of the general purposes of a negative income tax. 
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Can any assumptions be made concerning the value of k? In 
introducing withholding it was suggested that not all of the 
amount withheld was needed for actual withholding purposes. 
This means that some of the amount withheld can be applied 
to the projected overpayment. In all cases k will be less 
than or equal to the value of j, as the numerator of (4-11) 
is less than or equal to the numerator of (4-6). 
The Specific Model 
Equation (4-11) is a general statement which holds 
under any conditions. Chapter II indicated that the specific 
plan discussed would be a fractional EX-MSD plan. For the 
equation this means that B = X. Rewriting (4-11) and the 
dummy variable equations yields: 
k = blr[(l-t)(X-E)-bo(X-E')J - w[bz[E'-(1-t)E-tJft -b3(E'-X)J 
E' - (1-t)E - tX 
where b0 , b1 , b2 , and b3 are characterized by the following 
properties: 
bo = 1 for, X > E' b0 = o for, X < E', S , bl = 1 for, E'-(1-t)E-tX:>Q bl= 0 for, E' -(1-t) E-tX~O 6 I ) , I ) , b2 = 1 for, E -(1-t E-tX>O, b2 = 0 for, E -(1-t E-tX~O, 
b3 = 1 for, X ~ E', b3 = 0 for, X' > E'. 
Sb 
= 1 if r(l-t)(X-E) > r(X-E'), 1 
or X-tX-(1-t)E 7 X-E' 
' , or E -(1-t)E-tX.> 0. 
6b 
2 = 1 if E' -(1-t)E > X . tN ~, multiply by tN, 
E ' - ( 1-t) E :> tX, 
or E'-(1-t)E-tX > 0. 
Therefore b1 = b2 and l-b0 = b3• For X m B, only the case 
of b 1 = 1 need be considered.
7 Equation (4-11) can now be 
rewritten: 
r( (1-t) (X-E)-b0 (X-E')] - w[E' -(1-t)E-tX:- (l-b0) (E' -X)] 
k = E' - (l-t)E - tx 
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(4-12) 
Now allow b0 to be zero and one •.. This generates two 
equations: 
k r [E' - (1-t)E - tXf - w[E' - (1-t)I • tX], 
a !• - ( -t)E - tX 
k = <r-w>c~: - H:m : ~U 
k = (r-w), 
for bo ml; 
k r[X - (1-t)E - tX~ - w(X - (1-t)E - tX]. 
- E' - ( -t)E - tx 
( ) rX • (l•t)E - tx, k = r-w LE' - ti-t)E - txJ' 
k , (r-w), as X fi E', 





But, k is the rate applicable to current subperiod income. 
7This statement can be demonstrated in the following 
way: 
bt -= 0 if, E ' - ( 1-t) E - tX 6 0, 
or, E' JI: (1-t)E + tX, 
if E • X then, E' d& X 
but E < X because B • X, 
therefore, E' 1' (1-t)E - tX < X, 
or , E ' < X, and b0 • 1. If b1 =- 0 and bo • 1 the nUlilerator of (3-11) is~.equal to.,zero, ·· 
and any change should be ~eflected in negative tax payments. 
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For the amount which must be collected both sides of (4-12) 
will be multiplied by the subperiod taxable income. The new 
equations which hold under equilibrium, i.e., no overpayment 
or underpayment, can be written: 
k[E' - (1-t)E _ X] 
tN N 
= r[(l-t) (X-E)-bo(X-E')] -w[E'-(1-t)E-tX- (1-bo)(E'-X)J 
tN ' 
= r[X-(1-t)E-tX-boX+boE'J - w[X-(1-t)E-tX-boX+boE'] 
tN ' 
(r W) rX-(1-t)E bo(X-E') X~ 
ID - ~ tN - tN - ItJ' 
kCE'-~j-t)E - ~1= (r-w)[E'-(~Nt)E • i]• 
for ho= 1; 
k[E'-(1-t)E x7 (r w)[X-(1-t)E x, tN - - N""' = - -tN - - R'J' 
for bo = 0. 




Here lies a juncture in the analysis. How shall (4-12) 
or its related equation (4-15) be used? Three general 
courses seem to be available. Two methods involve the use 
of the formulas in their entirety. The results of their 
accurate application would be the elimination of over- and 
under-payments, under the assumptions listed at the beginning 
of this chapter. The use of these formulae would, however, 
be difficult. 
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Currently a formula similar to (4-9) is in use to com-
pute withholding liability. It is modified by the fact that 
the first bracketed term is considered one variable. The 
term 
E' - (1-t)E 
tN 
is a statement of current subperiod wages, called C. The 
expression can be written: 
where b 2 has the properties: 
b2 = 1 for, C ~ X/N b2 = 0 for, C ~ X/N. 
(4-18) 
The amount withheld is based on three variables, C, X, and N. 
All three of these variables are readily observable. The 
rate w can be considered a constant. The three variables are 
fairly easy to tabulate. By having separate tables based on 
N (weekly, biweekly, monthly, etc.) and by using C and X as 
rows and columns or by operating on these two variables to 
obtain taxable income and using this figure in a row the 
liability Wis easily found. 8 
The case of b0 = 1 for the equations (4-12) and (4-15) 
would work in the same manner as the current withholding 
system. However, to know b0 the value of E' must be avail-
able. Furthermore to compute negative tax withholding for 
h0 = 0 the values of E and t must be known. While tis 
8 U.S., Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service, 
Circular E: Employer's Tax Guide, pp. 19-41. 
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observable, E' and E are known only by the individual recip-
ients and must be obtained from them. Above these consider-
ations is the increase in the number of variables which 
precludes the tabulation of withholding tax liability for 
negative tax recipients. The only method of finding this 
liability is by operation of formula (4-15). 
Two entities could operate on this formula. One, the 
employer could operate the formula. This seems to be unwise. 
For one, the formula would unduly complicate a relatively 
simple system. Secondly, the increased paperwork may well 
prejudice an employer against hiring a negative tax recip-
ient. Such a situation would be highly undesirable. 
Alternatively the administrative agency itself could be 
the operator. The value k = r-w will always yield a repay-
ment greater than or equal to the necessary return. If the 
employer uses k. r-w the negative tax administrator could 
operate on the equation (4-15). The administrator would 
subtract the amount given by (4-15) from the amount withheld 
by the employer. The amount withheld by the employer can be 
written: 
The difference is then written: 
S" = (r-w)[E'-(1-t)E _ x]··_ (r-w)[X-{1-t)E _ bn(X-E') _ XJ 
tN N tN tN N • 
The operation would not be as difficult as it first appears 
as the equation reduces to: 
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s" = (r-w) [E' -(1-t)E _ X-(1-t)E bo(X-E') X X, 
tN tN + tN - N - NJ' 
or S" = (r-w) [E' -X-~Q(E' -X) J, 
or s" = (r-w) [(1-bai~E' -X)} (4-19) 
S" indicates the new subperiod subsidy to be paid by the neg-
ative income tax administrator. 
There are reasons for not using (4-15) explicitly and 
for not allowing the administration to reimburse the over 
taxed recipient-worker. One could argue that this would 
create burdensome administrative problems. Also there may 
be a case for the existence of a payment illusion. One could 
argue that the higher withholding (caused by k ~ r-w when k 
could be less than r-w) and the resultant lower take home pay 
may cause some recipients to feel that working is not worth 
the effort. In any case the second course of action would 
be to set k £ r-w. The rate k would be decreased in relation 
to some variable, most probably taxable subperiod income. 
In essence this would mean the replacement of k for w 
in equation (4-18). The analogy to the current withholding 
system ends here. The current system assumes that the sub-
period income has been earned and will be earned in every sub-
period of the year. The assumption made in this section that 
income increases at some time during the year is exactly op-
posite to the current assumption. To change this negative 
tax assumption to correspond to the current assumption would 
be illogical. It is impossible here and now to select a val-
ue or values fork. This is a separate study. To evaluate 
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k one would need to have a sample of potential negative tax 
recipients (the CGF project offers an excellent possibility). 
Next all changes in income for the individuals in the sample 
would have to be traced and the values of k computed for each 
subperiod. The values of k could be tested for correlation 
to taxable subperiod income or any other variable deemed ap-
propriate. If it is found that k is correlated to any of 
these variables a system of k values similar tow values 
could be found. While this paper cannot investigate the 
correct values of k, the writer does not wish to dismiss the 
assignment of k values. Instead it is suggested that any 
value of k such that, 
0 < k ~ (r-w), (4-20) 
is better thank= 0. In other words any legitimate value of 
k (defined by 4-20) would be better than not providing any 
special negative tax withholding schedule·. 
Sunnnary 
Chapter IV has discussed changes in the current with-
holding tax structure which would make a negative income tax 
system more responsive to projected overpayments. Chapter V 
will attempt to evaluate these suggestions. The two pro-
posed changes in the withholding system will be tested. The 
method of full withholding such that, k a r-w with the ad-
ministrator resubsidizing the projected overwithholding, the 
method of choosing arbitrary k values, and the current 
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withholding method will be examined side by side for purposes 
of contrast and comparison. The question of multiple income 
changes will also be examined. 
CHAPTER V 
EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED MECHANISM 
Chapter V will be concerned with the evaluation of the 
principles developed above. It will begin with a review of 
the need-payment lag as based on findings in Chapter II and 
revised by comments concerning administration in Chapter III. 
After the basic need-payment lags are established the pro-
posals for changing the withholding tax structure will be 
discussed and evaluated, and examples of alternate situations 
will be analyzed. 
Need-Payment Lag 
Conclusions as to the length of need-payment lags under 
a negative tax timing mechanism will of necessity be somewhat 
arbitrary. Their foundations must lie in examples offered by 
presently operating institutions. These foundations will be 
altered through the evaluation of problems peculiar to a 
negative income tax. The exact nature or extent of all such 
peculiar problems cannot really be known until a pilot pro-
gram is initiated. Furthermore, current problems being 
handled by existing institutions may either expand or dimin~ 
ish depending on circumstances. The semiconflicting goals 
of need-payment lag minimization and administrative cost 
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efficiency should necessarily receive consideration. This 
section will analyze current institutional functions and then 
discuss peculiar negative tax problems. 
Current Institutions 
In order to form a basic conception of what the need-
payment la·g must be the SSA and the Oklahoma Public Assist-· . . 
-.... 
ance procedures will be analyzed. One point in this 
discussion will concern the exact type of payment. The pay-
ments can be made ex ante, at the beginning of the subperiod 
or ex post, at the end of the subperiod. Because it is the 
current trend in most institutions and because it is intui-
tively the most feasible, the month will be considered the 
subperiod. Ex ant~ payments will be made on the first day 
of the month. Ex post payments will be considered to be made 
on the last day of the month. 1 The SSA makes ex post pay-
ments, and the Oklahoma Public Welfare Department issues ex 
ant~ payments. 
The initial check from the SSA comes on the average six 
weeks after the date of application. That is, a claim filed 
about the middle of June would warrant a July check, dated 
July 31. A claim filed on June 1 would receive a June pay-
ment about the middle of July and a July payment as above. 
The claim is assumed to be made ex ante of -earned income. 
The initial theoretical need-payment lag would be six weekso 
1The SSA actually pays on the third day of the follow-
ing month; however, assumption of payment on the last day 
will add to the clarity of the discussion. 
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Actual periodic corrections would depend chiefly on the fre-
quency of the communication between the recipient and the 
administration. It is assumed that the recipient informs the 
SSA immediately of any change in status. Again it will take 
six weeks to effect a correction in a recipient's payments, 
the exception being a complete cessation of payment. Such 
action requires approximately fifteen days to complete. 2 It 
can be shown that one or two incorrect payments may be made 
during this interval. The general SSA procedure for handling 
incorrect payments especially those entailing overpayments, 
is to have the recipient return the check and awai't issuance 
of another payment. Six weeks will not elapse between date 
of return and reissuance as the matter of return is settled 
in the first interview immediately after the change of 
status. 3 
Turning to the Oklahoma Public Welfare system reveals a 
different type of organization. For one, payments are made 
ex anti. Initial processing requires on the average only one 
month. If processing is completed after the first but before 
the twentieth of the month a check is issued for that month. 4 
Initial processing can, therefore, create up to a five and 
2Bill Godwin, Oklahoma City District Office, Social Se-
curity Administration, Private Interview, Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma, November 22, 1968. 
3Ibid. 
4oale Mitchell, Director of the Division of Research and 
Statistics, Department of Public Welfare, State of Oklahoma, 
Private Interview, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, November 22, 
1968. 
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one-half weeks need-payment lag. Changes in status are re-
flected in the following check. Hence, in essence no lag is 
encountered for periodic processing. Next problems peculiar 
to or more acute in a negative tax system will be analyzed. 
Peculiar Negative Tax Problems 
There does not appear to be any negative tax situation 
which would constitute a completely new problem in relation 
to current institutions. The main differences concern the 
frequency and magnitude of certain occurrences. Chiefly 
these include an increase in the absolute number of case 
loads, and an increase in changes of status. Changes of 
status will normally be income changes. It is logical to 
anticipate that the proportion of changes in status would be 
greater for negative tax recipients than SSA beneficiaries 
where status changes occur rather infrequently. 5 It is also 
logical to assume that such a statement is also true of the 
relationship between negative tax recipients and Public As-
sistance recipients, the reasons being the nature of the 
people who receive Public Assistance aid. Since this aid.is 
given to the oldj disabled, blind, and families with depend-
ent children it is obvious that the labor force participation 
rates for these groups would be far less than the broader 
classification of all poor who would receive negative income 
tax paymentso 
511current Operating Statistics," Table Q-13, p. 51. 
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The combination of these two differences would create 
additional work for the administrative agency. If the staffs 
of the current institutions remain at present levels, the 
need-payment lag would certainly increase. But, there would 
very likely be an increase in administrative personnel. This 
coupled with wider use of modern data processing yields no 
necessary difference between current lags and projected neg-
ative tax lags. There is the possibility of increased lags, 
but circumstances do not warrant their injection at this 
point. The final arbiter of an increase in the need-payment 
lag will be Congress. Their definition of family unit, in-
come, and investigative restrictions will determine posi-
tively if any increase in current estimates are needed. 
Collation and Summation 
Since no extra lag time is herein attributed to negative 
tax plans per se the time periods suggested in the section on 
current institutions will stand. Table IV summarizes these 
time lags. At least in this matter it appears that Public 
Assistance is a superior system; it is quicker in reacting 
to changes in status than the SSA. This may be because Pub-
lic Assistance is state controlled and therefore smaller in 
scope and more easily administered. Data in the SSA must 
travel from the District Office to the Regional Payment Of-
fice and then to the Treasury. This obviously lengthens the 
time involved. 
Does this finding conflict with the earlier suggestion 























































Source: Bill Godwin, Oklahoma City District Office, Social 
Security Administration, Private Interview, Okla-
homa City, Oklahoma, November 22, 1968; Dale 
Mitchell, Director of Research and Statistics, De-
partment of Public Welfare, State of Oklahoma, 
Private Interview, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 
November 22, 1968. 
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tax system? Not necessarily. An important consideration is 
interstate mobility. As indicated in chapter two, inter-
state mobility creates a major Public Assistance drawback as 
it is presently constituted. Termination and reprocessing 
would most likely cause loss of one or more monthly payments. 
Individual states would be most anxious to recover overpay-
ments as soon as possible, and would exert pressure on the 
recipient to accomplish same. Finally there is the problem 
of uniformity among the states. Both of these situations 
combined indicate that this type of administration would re-
duce mobility. Interferences with worker and recipient mo-
bility should generally be rejected as interferences with 
economic efficiency. 
A final note concerns the previously suggested possi-
bility of a nationally administered system of Public Assist-
ance. Under such a program it would be difficult to argue 
that the Public Assistance lag estimates given in Table IV 
would be applicable. Such a system would likely have lags 
somewhere between those of the SSA and the current Public 
Assistance systems. The lags will be closer to those associ-
ated with current Public Assistance the more autonomous the 
state agencies are, and closer to the SSA lags the more na-
tionalized the system becomes. Since any national system 
would probably resemble the SSA in administrative techniques, 
the lags given in Table IV will not be altered. These lags 
will be accepted as given. 
70 
Over- and Under-Payments 
Chapter IV developed two withholding systems which would 
be feasible to operate in a negative tax system. It was 
stated at that time that t~ese two plans would be tested. 
This will be done by delineating several possible examples of 
families with changing incomes. These examples will be set 
forth by using the formulae developed in Chapter IV, current 
withholding schedules and positive tax liability formulas. 
The results derived from the proposals will be compared to 
those derived using present procedures. Before undertaking 
this type of analysis some general remarks must be made con-
cerning changes in income. 
Decreases in Expected Income6 
Decreases in income in a negative tax system will not 
normally lead to an overpayment. As expectation of future 
income decreases the total subsidy due will be greater than 
originally estimated. This, of course, means that the sub-
period subsidy originally paid is too low. Therefore, the 
subsidy must be revised upward. If it is not increased an 
underpayment will result. Obviously the only way an over-
payment would occur is if the revised subsidy were to be too 
high, or in other words, a mistake is made. 
There are many possible methods of handling this in-
crease in subsidy. Because of the earlier findings_ concerning 
6see Category 1 in Table II, page 41. 
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lags two possibilities readily suggest themselves. One, the 
individual's current payments could be stopped. The amount 
already paid would be subtracted from the new amount due and 
this remainder would be spread over the remaining payment 
subperiods. The first check would be mailed as soon as pos-
sible. Judging from earlier information this would be ap-
proximately six weeks after the recipient notifies the agency 
of a decrease in income. For example, a recipient loses· his 
income (which was originally small) on ~arch 1. He notifies 
the negative tax administrator on that day. The agency would 
stop payment of his March 31 subsidy. A review and recalcu-
lation of his subsidy would be made. The revised March check 
would be delivered around April 15 followed by a revised 
April payment on the thirtieth of that month. The process 
would then continue as normal. 
The second solution is not to stop the checks, but to 
recalculate the recipient's subsidy under the assumption that 
one or two more subsidy payments of the old amount will be 
issued. The timing of the subsidy payments will not be al-
tered. Using the example above the recipient would receive 
a March 31 check in the amount of the original subsidy. The 
April 30 check would be revised to reflect the correct 
amount. Payments would continue as usual showing the new 
payment. This plan will be called Plan 4 in the examples. 
The first proposal is Plan 3. 
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Increases in Income7 
Increases in income fall into two main groups. One, in-
creases in income which require a change in subsidy paid 
without requiring any repayments. Such changes are analogous 
to decreases in income and will be handled in the~.f?'.ame manner.~--. 
Other increases will require repayment of all or part of the 
subsidy. Four different approaches for handling such changes 
will be studied. 
In Chapter IV it was suggested that there were two prac-
tical alternatives to the operation of Formula (4-15). One 
thought was to have the employer apply the negative income 
tax withholding rate, k, such that k = r-w, 8 and allow the 
negative tax administration to resubsidize any projected 
underpayment. This will be called Plan 1 in the examples. 
A second alternative, Plan 2 would have the employer ap-
ply some arbitrary rate such that, 
0 <.. k ~r-w. 
To study this hypothesis Plan 2 is divided into two sub-plans o 
Plan 2a describes k as, 
k = 1%, 
and Plan 2b sets, 
k = r-w. 
Plan 2a is used to demonstrate that any positive value of k 
7see categories 2 and 3 in Table II, page 41. 
8To review the terms, r is the negative income tax rate 
and w is the current withholding tax rate. 
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will generally be superior to k = 0. Plan 2b, on the other 
hand, illustrates the maximum effect that Plan 2 would have. 
The unaltered current withholding system will constitute the 
fourth approach. 
Examples 
Eleven examples were chosen. These examples were se~ 
lected by using random numbers. The method of selection and 
computation and the results including monthly sunnnaries can 
be found in Appendix A. A summary of the characteristics of 
the examples is given in Table V. Table VI reviews the plans. 
The important results derived from the examples are given in 
Table VII. There were several assumptions made concerning 
the examples which should be stated at this time. The income 
and subsidy payments were.considered to be smooth or constant 
for each subperiod. The subperiod operated in is the month. 
All changes in income were assumed to occur and be reported 
on the first day of the month. 
In order to fully understand their importance the col-
u.tnns of Table VII should be explained. Column one, Over-
(Under-) Payment, indicates the dollar amount of over- and 
under-payments generated by the various proposals. Column 2, 
Over- (Under-) Payment as a Percentage of Next January's In-
come, gives an index of the effect of over- and under-· 
payments. It is assumed that the individual or family will 
continue to earn the same gross incomeo Hence, this per-
centage indicates the relative value of over- or under-






























































9To review, the variables are: Eis the original ex-
pected income; E' is the revised expected income; Xis EX-
MSD; and tis that fraction of the period remaining after 











SUMMARY OF PLANS 
Characteristics 
k = r-w, a revised subsidy is issued by the ad-
ministrator. 
k = 1%. 
k = r-w. 
Subsidy payment is stopped and revised subsidy 
is distributed over remaining subperiods. 
Same as 3 except negative tax withholding is 
refunded. 
Subsidy payment is continued, revised subsidy 
reflects the extra payments. 





SUMMARY OF EXAMPLE RESULTS 
Over Over i Marginal . Net 
Plans (Under) 
(Under) M~ry - Tax Rate Income of 
Pay- Payments T: Plan 1 Period n k % of Jan. R x with re- as % of 
ments Income ate visions Period n-1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
A: 26.48 
Current $ 91.71 40.73 38.52 
Plan 1 2.52 1.12 49.90 45.80 
Plan 2a 88.20 39.15 38.83 
Plan 2b ( 32.48) ( 14.87) 49.90 
B: 1.53 
Current f 91.25 13.63 22.76 Plan 1 25.43) ( 3.80) 49.98 20.93 
Plan 2a 31.57 4.72 23.68 
Plan 2b (1,678.43) (250.18) 49.98 
C: 36.00 
Current $ 6.05 1.92 48.79 
Plan 1 0.17 0.05 49 .. 96 49.96 
Plan 2a 5.89 1.87 48.82 
Plan 2b 0.17 0.05 49.96 
D: 0 
Current 0 0 50.00 
Plan 1 0 0 50.00 50.00 
Plan 2a 0 0 50.00 
Plan 2b 0 0 50.00 
E: 35.21 
Current $ 263.46 76.10 23.68 
Plan 1 1.32 0.38 49.87 49.87 
Plan 2a 255.99 73.95 24.40 
Plan 2b 1.32 0.38 49.87 
F: 32.84 
Current $ 549.83 77.18 27.09 
Plan 1 0.32 0.04 49.99 49.99 
Plan 2a 533.09 74.82 27.79 
Plan 2b 0.32 0.04 49.99 
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TABLE VII {Continued) 






(Under) na! Tax Rate Income of 
Payments Ta Plan 1 Period n k 
% of Jan.Rat: with re- as % of 
Income visions Period n-1 








294.47 44.89 26.77 
12.45) ( 1.90) 50.03 31.42 
27.47 265.35 40.45 
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K: Plan 3a 
Plan 1 $( 41.10) 
41.10) 
41.10) 
Plan 2a ( 
Plan 2b ( 







( 44 .. 52) 
( 145.29) 
K: Plan 4a 
Plan 1 $( 
Plan 2a ( 








( 15.38) 36.80 21.54 
( 54.40) 49.98 38.03 21.68 
( 16.66) 37.24 21.59 
( 54.40) 49.98 23.12 
( 15.38) 49.98 38.03 21.68 
( 15.38) 37.24 21.59 
( 15.38) 49.98 23.12 
( 15.38) 36.80 21.54 
(. 54.40) 49.98 38.03 27.91 
( 16 .. 66) 37.24 21.59 
( 54.40) 49.98 23.12 
( 15.38) 49.98 38.03 27.91 
( 15.38) 37.24 21.59 







Column three, Marginal Tax Rate, is simply the loss of 
subsidy plus withholding over the increase in gross income. 
Column four is the Marginal Tax Rate when the revised subsidy 
for Plan 1 is included. This is not a true marginal tax rate 
but it does give an indication of the effect of Plan l's re-
vised subsidy on the recipient's net income. Column 5, Net 
Income of the Change Month as a Percentage of the Previous 
Month's Income, is used for Plans 3 and 4 to show the impact 
of changes on disposable income. Column 6 is simply the cal-
culated value of k. 
Evaluation 
It should be noted that Example Dis of a class all its 
own. It does not really fit with increases in income result-
ing in repayments of subsidy, nor does it fit into any other 
category. The reason is that taxable subperiod income after 
the change in income is zero. Example D requires no changes 
in subsidy nor repayment of subsidy, but is handled simply 
by stopping the subsidyo Example Dis, therefore, the exam-
ple situated between Plans 1 and 2 and Plans 3 and 4, but 
affected by none of these proposals. 
What about changes in income which do not require a re-
payment of subsidy? The Examples H, I, and J demonstrate 
that neither Plan 3 or Plan 4 offers an optimal solution. 
As shown by Example I, families entering the negative tax 
program after the first of the year, there is no substantial 
difference between the two planso Example H shows that 
Plan 4 is superior for decreases in the income of current 
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recipients. Note, while neither plan results in an over- or 
under-payment, net income under Plan 3 is much more volatile 
than net income under Plan 4. Column 5 of Table VII indi-
cates that under Plan 3 the recipient will incur a sixty-two 
percent decrease in take home pay, while he loses only thirty 
percent under Plan 4. Gross earned income falls by forty-
four percent. 
On the other hand Example J demonstrates the superiority 
of Plan 3 under certain cases of increasing income. The is-
suance of the extra payment under Plan 4 results in an over-
payment. Plan 4 will not always generate an overpayment 
under these general circumstances of an increase in income, 
but as illustrated an overpayment is a possibility. Also 
under this example it is Plan 4 which generates the more vol-
atile net incomeo 
The solution lies in one of two possible changes. One, 
use Plan 4 for decreases in income and Plan 3 for increases 
in income.. The second change is to modify Plan 4 to include 
the stopping of one or more payments associated with such 
cases as Example Jo The only difference between the two 
solutions will be in the way revised payments are distributed 
over the remaining months o The examples in ·Appendix A il-
lustrate this point. 
Evaluation of increases in income resulting in repayment 
of all or part of the subsidy previously paid is more diffi-
cult o Observation of the data in Table VII reveals that any 
of the three proposed plans, 1, 2a, and 2b, would reduce the 
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amount of overpayment. However, these reductions are re-
lated to increases in the marginal tax rate. On an a priori 
basis it can be shown that a decrease in overpayments will 
mean an increase in the amount withheld from gross income. 
Because the change in gross income is constant the marginal 
tax rate must necessarily rise. 
This can be demonstrated on an empirical plane. Take 
the differences between the over- or under-payments associ-
ated with Plans 2a and 2b and the current system. Rank these 
differences with the increases in the marginal tax rate and 
apply the rank correlation technique. The resultant corre-
lation coefficient for Plan 2a is, 
rs= -0.7857, 
and the coefficient for Plan 2b is, 
r = -0 8286 s . • 
Both correlation coefficients are significant at the five 
percent level olO In other words there exists a dependency 
between increases in the marginal tax rate and decreases in 
overpaymentso 
Obviously if there was a positive relationship there 
would be no problem in choosing the superior system. The 
lOE. G. Olds, uDistribution of Sums of Squares of Rank 
Differences for Small Numbers of Individuals," The Annals of 
Mathematical Statistics, 9 (1938), Table IV, p.7:45. Acor-
relation coefficient for Plan 1 is not available because of 
the introduction of the revised subsidy. Without this sub-
sidy Plan 1 would be equivalent to Plan 2b. 
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complication of the negative correlation introduces the need 
for subjective judgment. Table VIII may aid in such a de-
cision. The Table shows the elasticity coefficients for the 
percentage change in overpayments relative to the percentage 
change in the marginal tax rates. To illustrate for Example 
A, a Plan 2a negative tax withholding system which yields a 
one percent increase in the marginal tax rate will cause a 
4. 76 percent decrease in the amount of overpayment~1 Five of 
the six examples yield elastic coefficients. Unless it can 
be demonstrated that the increased marginal tax rates will 
greatly decrease work effort incentive it would be wiser to 
eliminate the overpayments by one of the proposals. 
In support of decreasing overpayments one should note 
Column two of Table VII. Two of the examples, A and G, show 
that over forty percent of one month's income would be needed 
to repay the overpayment. Two other examples, E and F, show 
that the recipient would have to give up three quarters of 
his take home pay in order to satisfy his overpayment debt. 
These results, in four of the six cases which show repayment 
of subsidy, demonstrate the need for some sort of automatic 
repayment system. As shown both Plan 1 and Plan 2 would pro-
vide for this automatic collection. 
It is interesting to note that Plans 2a and 2b were 
offered in support of the statement in Chapter IV which 
11Note that a one percent increase in the marginal tax 
rate does not mean the addition of one percentage point to 
the rate (i.e., 25% to 26%), but indicates an increase of 
one percent of the original rate (i.e., 25% to 25.25%). 
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TABLE VIII 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS OF OVERPAYMENTS TO RELATIVE 




































indicated that any k with the characteristics, 
r-w ~ k > O, 
was better than k = 0. The elasticities shown above tend to 
support this statement. The statement itself was made in 
connection with the possibility of a floating k which would 
vary with some other observable variable. The rank correla-
tion technique was applied to the calculated k in relation 
to several other variables. The results are found in Table 
IX. Because of the small number of observations and because 
of the method of example selection these relationships are 
offered only as indications for future study. This writer 
does not suggest that these correlations are final. 
Finally some connnents on the multiple example, K, are 
in order. Example K illustrates that multiple changes in 
income introduce no substantive difficulties to the timing 
mechanism. However, it is true that there exists a great 
deal more complexity of calculation in this type of example. 
Example K carried one proposal which could be expanded and 
which could have been incorporated in Example I. The nega-
tive tax withholdings were rechanneled back to the recipient. 
The same could have been done for the normal withholdings. 
The absolute amount of such withholding would not normally 
be large and the final decision on its return should be 




RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF 
k AND RELATED VARIABLES 
Related Variable 
Subperiod Taxable Income 
Subperiod Gross Income 
Final Annual Income (E') 
Annual Taxable Income (E'-X) 
Number of Months Remaining (t) 
Correlation Significance 
Coefficients at .05 Level 
-0.7143 Not Significant 






The first half of this chapter dealt with the problem 
of the need-payment lag. Existing lags in the current insti-
tutions were examined. Next problems which would be peculiar 
or more acute under a negative tax system were introduced. 
While it is obviously impossible to reduce the need-payment 
lag to zero the minimal time requirements were established 
and sunnnarized in Table IV. With these lags as a base the 
proposals for a change in the withholding system as well as 
other methods of reacting to recipient income changes were 
evaluated. The results of this discussion were based pri-
marily on the data in Tables VII and VIII. Final conclusions 
will be collated and discussed in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
This study was designed to analyze the payments mechan-
ism of a negative income tax system. The central theme was 
the optimization of the two primary goals associated with a 
timing schema, the two goals being the elimination of the 
need-payment lag and the eradication of over- and under-
payments. Action taken to achieve the goals was held sub-
ordinate to the primary negative tax goal of income 
maintenance, and restrained by the need for reasonable costs. 
With this in mind the need-payment goal was given top 
priority. 
The Findings 
It was argued and demonstrated that a national organi-
zation dealing in social services should administer a nega-
tive tax program. The only available organization with these 
qualities is the Social Security Administration. The possi-
bility of a new national ,Public Assistance program was not 
eliminated from consideration. It was shown, however, that 
a truly national Public Assistance organization would most 
probably be patterned after SSA methods and procedures. Be-
cause of this the analysis of the need-payment lag concerned 
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itself primarily with the SSA. The Oklahoma Public Assist-
ance program was offered as a contrast to the SSA results. 
The current Public Assistance program was ruled out due to 
problems concerning recipient mobility and uniform applica-
tion of the program. 
Analysis of the need-payment lag indicated that it could 
be reduced to six weeks for the starting and changing of pay-
ments, and to two weeks for complete cessation of payments. 
The changes of payments refer only to the amount of subsidy. 
Transfers of residence or job (if wages were the same) or 
other changes not affecting income or family size would cre-
ate no lag problem under a nationally administered program 
such as the SSA could provide. It was shown that under a 
system of monthly subsidation that from zero to two incor-
rect checks could be issued. 
The possible issuance of incorrect payments and the dis-
tinct possibility that recipients will not inform the ad.min-
istration immediately of changes in status or will not be 
accurate in their estimates of future income creates problems 
related to the second goal. Over- and under-payments were 
found to be an important obstacle in the creation of a true 
income maintenance program. Over- and under-payments will 
be discussed in two groups. The first will be those assoc-
iated with changes in income which require cessation of 
original subsidy and repayment of all or part of the paid 
subsidy. The second group will be concerned with changes 
which require changes in subsidy payments only. 
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Situations of the first type result chiefly in overpay-
ments. It was shown that burdensome overpayments could re-
sult if some method was not employed to automatically rectify 
the misappropriations. 1 Toward establishment of an automatic 
collection method equation (4-12), 
k = r [ ( 1-t) (X-E) -bo (X-E')] - w[E' -(1-t)E-tX-(l-bo) (E 1 -X)] 
E'-(1-t)E-tX 
was developed. The value of k is the rate which when applied 
to subperiod taxable income would yield the correct repayment .. 
It was established that equation (4-12) and the related 
formula (4-15) could be used in three different ways. One 
suggestion that the employer operate the formulae was disre-
garded immediately. The other two suggestions, one calling 
for a floating k the other suggesting a resubsidation of 
projected underpayments were developed for further evaluation. 
Evaluation of the two plans revealed that either would 
reduce the absolute amount of overpayments as well as soften 
the relative impact of the repayment. The one drawback in 
the findings was the inverse relationship between changes in 
overpayments and the marginal tax rate. Analysis of the 
elasticity coefficient relating these two variables indicated 
that increases in marginal tax rates were generally associ-. 
ated with relatively larger decreases in overpayments. Un-
less it can be shown that the work incentive impact of 
increases in the marginal tax rates produces more harmful 
1see Appendix A, examples A, E, F, and G. 
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effects than the burdensome overpayments either of the two 
plans offered would constitute an improvement over present 
operations. Remember that only absolutely small overpayment 
amounts can be disregarded. Overpayments must and will be 
collected either during the period in question or shortly 
thereafter. 
Other overpayments can be caused by changes which occur 
so close to the end of the period that the need-payment lag 
precludes direct action on the subsidy during the period in 
question. However, it should be noted that the stop payment 
lag is relatively short, two weeks, compared to the period, 
fifty-two weeks. Therefore, the overpayment could not be 
expected to be of an excessive amount. In any case the over-
payment would be carried into the next period and the dis-
crepancy settled at that time. Greater problems would occur 
if the recipient did not inform the administration of in-
creases in income when they occur. 
Underpayments under the first set of circumstances would 
occur only if a mistake were made or if the k value applied 
were too large. This would only occur under the floating k 
plano The magnitude of such underpayments or the related 
overpayments would depend on the variance of observed k val-
ues around the true calculated k. 
The second type of over- and under-payments occurs for 
changes which require recalculation of the subsidy. In these 
situations underpayments would occur under two circumstances 
other than an error. One, if the recipient fails to notify 
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the agency of the need for increased payment and two, the 
change occurs too close to the end of the period to effect a 
change in that period. In the first case little can be done. 
In the second case the amount should be relatively small. 
Overpayments could occur only if Plan 4 in Chapter V was used 
and only if there was a decrease in needed subsidy. As shown 
in that chapter this problem is resolved by using Plan 3 on 
such cases. 
Reviewing briefly it can be seen that all over- and 
under-payments accruing to a given period can be prevented, 
except for those caused by lack of communication or lack of 
time. Over- and under-payments caused by these exceptions 
will be settled in the following periods. Those caused from 
lack of communication are to a large extent insolvable under 
any negative tax plan. Over- and under-payments occurring 
due to the lack of time to react are bound to be relatively 
small. The final source of possible over- or under-payments 
could come through the use of the floating k value. Decision 
on the use of such a plan would have to be based on any cost 
savings in relation to the occurrence and magnitude of over-
and under-payme-ntSo 
Recommendations for Further Study 
The lack of properly kept records indicating changes in 
income and other status requirements coupled with the lack of 
time and money to trace through other records constituted the 
single most limiting factor of this thesis. The records of 
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the Counc i 1 for Grants to Families should provide a treasure 
of usable data to further analyze payment mechanism require-
ments. Because of their frequency CGF income statements 
would provide a useful key to the exact changes in recipients 
income. Study of this data may even reveal that the over-
and under-payment problem is not as acute as this paper ob-
serves it to be. 
The major advantage of the CGF data will be to supply 
information for study of the k value. With the comprehensive 
CGF records the advisability of using a floating k plan can 
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In order to evaluate the suggested changes in the with-
holding tax structure examples of possible negative tax situ-
ations were chosen. The examples were formulated from a 
table of random digits. The table was entered and about 
seventy-five preliminary examples were selected. This was 
done by writing the numbers as they appeared, thusly: 
1324 ... 093. 
The numbers were then punctuated to yield: 
1300; 2400; 9; 3. 
In this case the number 3 indicates the number of exemptions 
to which the family in question was entitled to claim under 
IRS laws . The term expands to yield an EX-MSD of $2300. The 
terms then form the Example, A, such that: 
E = $1300; E' = $2400; t = 9/12; and X = $2300. 1 
As indicated seventy-five preliminary examples were 
chosen. Many of these were eliminated because they did not 
fit the study or they violated the assumptions given below. 
For instance, in many cases both E and E' were greater than 
X. Such an example is useless in demonstrating negative tax 
1 Reviewing the important variables and their definitions 
yields the following: E is the original expected income; E' 
is the revised expected income; t is that fraction of the 
period remaining after the change in income; X is EX-MSD; r 
is the negative tax rate; w is the current withholding tax 
rate; and k is the negative tax withholding rate. 
97 
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operations. The technique of selection was used for one 
main reason. This writer wished to eliminate the conscious 
or subconscious choice of only those examples which would 
demonstrate the results derived by analysis and theory in 
this thesis. In other words it is desirable to reduce as 
much as possible the subjective selection of examples. 
Next, certain assumptions were made concerning the exam-
ples and the operations to be performed on the examples. All 
incomes and subsidies were considered to be smooth flows with 
equal amounts accruing to each subperiod" All changes in in-
come were assumed to occur and be reported on the first day 
of the month in which the change takes place. The month 
constituted the subperiod. 
The calculations were made following these assumptions 
and using formulas derived in Chapter IV. To illustrate, the 
calculations for Example A will briefly be described. The 




$li~0 = $108.33. 











$2400-(1-9/12)$1300 = $ (9/12)-12 230.55. 
There is no new subsidy as E' > X. 
99 
The revised subsidy under Plan 1 is given by formula 
(4-19). The negative tax withholding amounts under Plans 1, 
2a, and 2b are derived by applying k = r-w, k = 1%, and k = 
r-w respectively to subperiod taxable income. Revised sub-
sidies under Plans 3 and 4 are calculated as described in 
the text (Chapter V). 
APPENDIX A - TABLE I 
EXAMPLES: MONTHLY SUMMARIES 
Jan. Feb. March April 
Example A: E = $1300; E' = $2400; 
X = $2300; t = 9/12. 
Earned Income 108.33 108.33 108.34 230.55 
Original Subsidy 41.67 41.67 41.66 
Current Withholding 5.41 
Net Income (Current Plan) 150.00 150.00 150.00 225.14 
Revised Subsidy (Per Plan 1) 
Negative Tax Withholding 13.91 
Net Income (Plan 1) 150.00 150.00 150.00 211.23 
Negative Tax Withholding 0.39 
Net Income (Plan 2a) 150.00 150.00 150 .00 224.75 
Negative Tax Withholding 13.91 
Net Income (Plan 2b) 150.00 150.00 150.00 211.23 
Example B: E = $ 100; E' = $6600; 
X = $ 900; t = 8/12. 
Earned Income 8.33 8.33 8.33 8.34 
Original Subsidy 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.34 
Current Withholding 
Net Income (Current Plan) 41.66 41.66 41.66 41.68 
Revised Subsidy (Per Plan 1) 
Negative Tax Withholding 
Net Income (Plan 1) ·41.66 41.66 41.66 41.68 
Negative Tax Withholding 
Net Income (Plan 2a) 41.66 41.66 41.66 41.68 
Negative Tax Withholding 
Net Income (Plan 2b) 41.66 41.66 41.66 41.68 
Example C: E = $ 800; E' = $4100; 
X = $5100; t - 2/12. 
Earned Income 66.67 66.66 66.67 66.67 
Original Subsidy 120.83 120.84 120.83 120.83 
Current Withholding 
Net Income (Current Plan) 187.50 187.50 187.50 187.50 
Revised Subsidy (Per Plan 1) 
Negative Tax Withholding 
Net Income (Plan 1) 187.50 187.50 187.50 187.50 
Negative Tax Withholding 
Net Income (Plan 2a) 187.50 187.50 187.50 187.50 
Negative Tax Withholding 
Net Income (Plan 2b) 187.50 187.50 187.50 187.50 
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May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Total 
230.56 230.55 230.56 230.55 230.56 230.55 230.56 230.56 2400.00 
125.00 
5.41 5.41 5.41 5.41 5.41 5.41 5.41 5.41 48.69 
225.15 225.14 225.15 225.14 225.15 225.14 225.15 225.15 2476 .31 . 
4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 36.00 
13.91 13.91 13.91 13.91 13.91 13.91 13.91 13.91 125.19 
215.74 215.73 215.74 215.73 215.74 215.73 215.74 215. 74 ~.2387 .12 
0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 3.51 
224.76 224.75 224.76 224.75 224.76 224.75 224.76 224.76 2472.80 
13.91 13.91 13.91 13.91 13.91 13.~n 13.91 13.91 125.19 
211.24 211.23 211.24 211.23 211.24 211.23 211.24 211.24 2351.12 
820.83 820.83 820.83 820.84 820.83 820.84 820.83 820.84 6600.00 
133.33 
151.56 151.56 151.56 151.S6 151.56 151.56 151.56 151.56 1212.48 
669.27 669.27 669.27 669.28 669.27 669.28 669.27 669.28 5520.85 
236.14 236.14 236.14 236.14 236.14 236.14 236.16 1653.00 
221.21 221.21 221.21 221.21 221.21 221.21 221.21 221.21 1769.68 
448.06 684.20 684.20 684.21 684.20 684.21 684.20 684.23 5404.17 
7.46 7.46 7.46 7.46 7.46 7.46 7.46 7.46 59.68 
661.81 661.81 661.81 661.82 661.81 661.82 661.81 661.82 5461.17 
221.21 221.21 221.21 221.21 221.21 221.21 221.21 221.21 1769.68 
448.06 448.06 448.06 448.07 448.06 448.07 448.06 448.07 3751.17 
... 
66.66 66.67 66.67 66.66 66.67 66.67 316.66 316.67 1300.00 
120.84 120.83 120.83 120.84 120.83 120.83 1208.33 
1.14 1.14 2.28 
187.50 187.50 187.50 187.50 187.50 187.50 315.52 315.53 2506.05 
2.94 2.94 5.88 
187.50 187.50 187.50 187.50 187.50 187.50 312.58 312.59 2500.17 
0.08 0.08 0.16 
187.50 187.50 187.50 187.50 187.50 187.50 315.44 315.45 2505.89 
2.94 2.94 5.88 
187.50 187.50 187.50 187.50 187.50 187.50 312.58 312.59 2500.17 
APPENDIX A - TABLE I 
(Continued) 
Jan. 
Example D: E = $3600; E' = $4100; 
X = $5100; t = 4/12. 
Earned Income 300.00 
Original Subsidy 62.50 
Current Withholding 
Net Income (Current Plan) 362.50 
Revised Subsidy (Per Plan 1) 
Negative Tax Withholding 
Net Income {Plan 1) 362.50 
Negative Tax Withholding 
Net Income (Plan 2a) 362.50 
Negative Tax Withholding 
Net Income {Plan 2b) 362.50 
Example E: E = $ 600; E' = $1600; 
X = $1600; t = 3/12. 
Earned Income 50.00 
Original Subsidy 41.67 
Current Withholding 
Net Income (Current Plan) 91.67 
Revised Subsidy {Per Plan 1) 
Negative Tax Withholding 
Net Income (Plan 1) 91.67 
Negative Tax Withholding 
Net Income (Plan 2a) 91.67 
Negative Tax Withholding 
Net Income {Plan 2b) 91.67 
Example F: E = $ 100; E' = $2500; 
X = $3000; t = 3/12. 
Earned Income 8.33 
Original Subsidy 120.83 
Current Withholding 
Net Income (Current Plan) 129.16 
Revised Subsidy (Per Plan 1) 
Negative Tax Withholding 
Net Income (Plan 1) 129.16 
Negative Tax Withholding 
Net Income (Plan 2a) 129.16 
Negative Tax Withholding 
Net Income (Plan 2b) 129.16 
Feb. March April 
300.00 300.00 300.00 
62.50 62.50 62.50 
362.50 362.50 362.50 
362.50 362.50 362.50 
362.50 362.50 362.50 
362.50 362.50 362.50 
50.00 50.00 50.00 
41.66 41.67 41.67 
91.66 91.67 91.67 
91.66 91.67 91.67 
91.66 91.67 91.67 
91.66 91.67 91.67 
8.34 8.33 8.33 
120.84 120.83 120.83 
129.18 129.16 129.16 
129.18 129.16 129.16 
129.18 129.16 129.16 
129.18 129.16 129.16 
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May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Total 
300.00 300.00 300.00 300.00 425.00 425.00 425.00 425.00 4100.00 
62.50 62.50 62.50 62.50 500.00 
362.50 362.50 362.50 362.50 425.00 425.00 425.00 425.00 4600.00 
362.50 397.so 362.50 362.50 425.00 425.00 425.00 425.00 4600.00 
362.50 362.50 362.50 362.50 425.00 425.00 425.00 425.00 4600.00 
362.50 362.50 362.50 362.50 425.00 425.00 425.00 425.00 4600.00 
50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 383.33 383.34 383.33 1600.00 
41.66 41.67 41.67 41.66 41.67 375.00 
37.18 37.18 37.18 111.54 
91.66 91.67 91.67 91.66 91.67 346.15 346.16 346.15 1863.46 
87.38 87.38 87.38 262.14 
91.66 91.67 91.67 91.66 91.67 258.77 258.78 258.77 1601.32 
2.49 2.49 2.49 7.47 
91.66 91.67 91.67 91.66 91.67 343.66 343.67 343.66 1855.99 
87.38 87.38 87.38 262.14 
91.66 91.67 91.67 91.66 91.67 258.77 258.78 258.77 1601.32 
8.34 8.33 8.33 8.34 8.33 808.33.: 808.34 808.33 2500.00 
120.84 120.83 120.83 120.84 120.83 1087.50 
95.89 95.89 95.89 287.67 
129.18 129.16 129.16 129.18 129.16 712.44 712.45 712.44 3299.83 
183.17 183.17 183.17 __ ·54g:551 
129.18 129.16 129.16 129.18 129.16 529.27 529.28 529.27 2750.32 
5.58 5.58 5.58 16.74 
129.18 129.16 129.16 129.18 129.16 706.86 706.87 706.86 3283.09 
183.17 183.17 183.17 549.51 
129.18 129.16 129.16 129.18 129.16 529.27 529.28 529.27 2750.32 
APPENDIX A - TABLE I 
(Continued) 
Jan. 
Example G: E = $1500; E' = $5700; 
X = $3700; t = 7/12. 
Earned Income 125.00 
Original Subsidy 91.67 
Current Withholding 
Net Income (Current Plan) 216.67 
Revised Subsidy (Per Plan 1) 
Negative Tax Withholding 
Net Income (Plan 1) 216.67 
Negative Tax Withholding 
Net Income (Plan 2a) 216.67 
Negative Tax Withholding 
Net Income (Plan 2b) 216.67 
Example H: E = $3300; E' = $2100; 
X = $6500; t = 10/12. 
Earned Income 275.00 
Original Subsidy 133.33 
Current Withholding 
Revised Subsidy (Plan 3) 
Net Income (Plan 3) 408.33 
Revised Subsidy (Plan 4) 
Net Income (Plan 4) 408.33 
Example I: E = $7500; E' = $5100; 
X = $6500; t = 8/12. 
Earned Income 625.00 
Original Subsidy 
Current Withholding 11.64 
Revised Subsidy (Plan 3) 
Net Income (Plan 3) 613.36 
Revised Subsidy (Plan 4) 
Net Income (Plan 4) 613.36 
Example J: E = $ 100; E' = $3700; 
X = $6500; t = 7 /12. 
Earned Income 8.33 
Original Subsidy 266.67 
Current Withholding 
Revised Subsidy (Plan 3) 
Net Income (Plan 3) 275.00 
Revised Subsidy (Plan 4) 
Net Income (Plan 4) 275.00 
Feb. March April 
125.00 125.00 125.00 
91.66 91.67 91.67 
216.66 216.67 216.67 
216.66 216.67 216.67 
216.66 216.67 216.67 
216.66 216.67 216.67 
275.00 155.00 155.00 
133.34 
386.67 
408.34 155.00 541.67 
133.33 200.00 
408.34 288.33 355.00 
625.00 625.00 625.00 
11.64 11.64 11.64 
613.36 613.36 613.36 
613.36 613.36 613.36 
8.34 8.33 8.33 
266.66 266.67 266.67 
275.00 275.00 275.00 
275.00 275.00 275.00 
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May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Total 
125.00 725.00 725.00 725.00 725.00 725.00 725.00 725.00 5700.00 
91.66 458.33 
68.98 68.98 68.98 68.98 68.98 68.98 68.98 482.86 
216.66 656.02 656.02 656.02 656.02 656.02 656.02 656.02 5675.47 
111.67 111.66 111.67 111.67 111.66 111.67 610.00 
139.56 139.56 139.56 139 .56 139.56 139 .56 139.56 976.92 
216.66 516.46 628.13 628.12 628 • .13 628.13 628.12 628.13 5368.55 
4.16 4.16 4.16 4. 16 4.16 4.16 4.16 29.12 
216.66 651.86 651.86 651.86 651.86 651.86 651.86 651.86 5646.35 
139.56 139.56 139.56 139.56 139.56 139.56 139.56 976.92 
216.66 516.46 516.46 516.46 516.46 516.46 516.46 516.46 4698.55 
155.00 155.00 155.00 155.00 155.00 155.00 155 .oo 155.00 2100.00 
266.67 
193.33 193.33 193.34 193.33 193.33 193.34 193.33 193.33 1933.33 
348.33 348.33 348.34 348.33 348.33 348.34 348.33 348.33 4300.00 
200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 200.00 1933.33 
355.00 355.00 355.00 355.00 355.00 355.00 355.00 355.00 4300.00 
325.00 325.00 325.00 325.00 325.00 325.00 325.00 325.00 5100.00 
46.56 
175.00 87.50 87.50 87.50 87.50 87.50 87.50 700.00 
325.00 500.00 412.50 412.50 412.50 412.50 412.50 412.50 5753.44 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 700.00 
.. 325.00 425.00 425.00 425.00 425.00 425.00 425.00 425.00 5753.44 
8.34 522.62 522.62 522.62 522.62 522.62 522.62 522.61 3700.00 
266.66 1333.33 
19.06 9.52 9.52 9.52 9.52 9.52 9.53 66.67 
275.00 522.62 541.68 532.14 532.14 532.14 532.14 532.14 5100.00 
266.67 266.67 
275.00 789.29 522.62 522.62 522.62 522.62 522.62 522.61 5300.00 
APPENDIX A - TABLE I 
(Continued) 
Jan. 
Example K: E = $3100; E' = $6000; 
E"= $2700; t' = 11/12. 
t"= 8/12 X =· . 
Earned Income 258.33 
Original Subsidy 83.33 
Current Withholding 
Revised Subsidy {Plan 3) 
Net Income (Current-3) 341.66 
Revised Subsidy {Plan 4) 
Net Income (Current-4) 341.66 
Revised Subsidy (Per Plan 1) 
Negative Tax Withholding 
Revised Subsidy (Plan 3) 
Net Income {Plan 1-3) 341.66 
Revised Subsidy (Plan 4) 
Net Income (Plan 1-4) 341.66 
Revised Subsidy (Plan 3a) 
Net Income (Plan 1-3a) 341.66 
Revised Subsidy (Plan 4a) 
Net Income {Plan l-4a) 341.66 
Negative Tax Withholding 
Revised Subsidy (Plan 3) 
Net Income {Plan 2a-3) 341.66 
Revised Subsidy {Plan 4) 
Net Income {Plan 2a-4) 341.66 
Revised Subsidy {Plan 3a) 
Net Income (Plan 2a-3a) 341.66 
Revised Subsidy (Plan 4a) 
Net Income (Plan 2a-4a) 341.66 
Negative Tax Withholding 
Revised Subsidy {Plan 3) 
Net Income {Plan 2b-3) 341.66 
Revised Subsidy (Plan 4) 
Net Income (Plan 2b-4) 341.66 
Revised Subsidy (Plan 3a) 
Net Income (Plan 2b-3a) 341.66 
Revised Subsidy {Plan 4a) 
Net Income (Plan 2b-4a) 341.66 
Feb. March April 
521.97 521.97 521. 97 
13.70 13.70 13.70 
508.27 508.27 508.27 
508.27 508.27 508.27 
31.50 31.50 
34.73 34.73 34.73 
473.54 505.04 505.04 
473.54 505.04 505.04 
473.54 505.04 505.04 
473.54 505.04 505.04 
1.14 1.14 1.14 
507.13 507.13 507.13 
507.13 507.13 507.13 
507.13 507.13 507.13 
507.13 507.13 507.13 
34.73 34.73 34.73 
473.54 473.54 473.54 
473.54 473.54 473.54 
473.54 473.54 473.54 
473.54 473.54 473.54 
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May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Total 
109.47 109.47 109.47 109.47 109.47 109.47 109.47 109.47 2700.00 
83.33 
41.10 
279.19 139.58 139.58 139.58 139.58 139.58 139.58 1116 .67 
109.47 388.66 249.05 249.05 249.05 249.05 249.05 249.05 3858.90 
159.49 159.53 159.53 159.53 159.53 159.53 159.53 1116.67 
109.47 268.96 269.00 369.00 269.00 269.00 269.00 269.00 3858.90 
63.00 
104.19 
263.42 131. 71 131. 71 131.71 131.71 131. 71 131.70 1053.67 
109.47 372.89 241.18 241.18 241.18 241.18 241.18 241.17 3754.71 
31.50 146.02 146.03 146.02 146.02 146.03 146.02 146.03 1053.67 
140.97 255.49 255.50 249.49 249.49 249.50 249.49 249.50 3754.71 
289.46 144.73 144. 74 144. 73 144.73 144. 74 144.73 1157.86 
109.47 398.93 254.20 254.21 254.20 254.20 254.21 254.20 3858.90 
31.50 160.91 160.91 160.91 160.91 160.91 160.91 160.90 1157.86 
140.97 270.38 270.38 270.38 270.38 270.38 270.38 270.37 3858.90 
3.42 
279.17 139.58 139.58 139.58 139 .59 139.58 139.59 1116.67 
109.47 388.64 249.05 249.05 249.05 249.06 249.05 249.06 3855.48 
159.49 159.53 159.53 159.53 159.53 159.53 159.53 1116.67 
109.47 268.96 269.00 269.00 269.00 269.00 269.00 269.00 3855.48 
280.03 140.01 140.01 140.01 140.01 140.01 140.01 1120.09 
109:47 389.50 249.48 249.48 249.48 249.48 249.48 249.48 3858.90 
160.01 160.01 160.01 160.01 160.01 160.01 160.03 1120.09 
109.47 269.48 269.48 269.48 269.48 269.48 269.48 269.50 3858.90 
104.19 
279.19 139.58 139.58 139.58 139.58 139.58 139.58 1116.67 
109.47 388.66 249.05 249.05 249.05 249.05 249.05 249.05 3754.71 
159.49 159.53 159 .53 159.53 159.53 159.53 159.53 1116.67 
109.47 268.96 269.00 269.00 269.00 269.00 269.00 269.00 3754.71 
305.20 152.61 152.61 152.61 152.61 152.61 152.61 1220.86 
109.47 414.67 262.08 262.08 262.08 262.08 262.08 262.08 3858.90 
174.40 174.41 174.41 174.41 174.41 174.41 174.41 1220.86 
109.47 283.87 283.88 283.88 283.88 283.88 283.88 283.88 3858.90 
APPENDIX A - TABLE II 
REVIEW OF PLANS 
EXAMPLES A, B, C, D, E, F, and G 
., .... 
. :r 
Examples Total Total Excess Total Positive Subsidy Subsidy Subsidy Amount Tax 
and Plans Paid ·:_. Due Paid Withheld Liability 
Example A 
Current 125.00 0 125.00 48.69 15 .40 
Plan 1 161.00 0 161.00 173.88 15.40 
Plan 2a 125.00 0 125.00 52.20 15.40 
Plan 2b 125.00 0 125.00 173.88 15.40 
Example B 
Current 133.33 0 133.33 1212.48 1170.40 
Plan 1 1786.33 0 1786.33 2982.16 1170.40 
Plan 2a 133.33 0 133.33 1272.16 1170.40 
Plan 2b 133.33 0 133.33 2982.16 1170.40 
Example C 
Current 1208.33 1200.00 8.33 2.28 0 
Plan 1 1208.33 1200.00 8.33 8.16 0 
Plan 2a 1208.33 1200.00 8.33 2.44 0 
Plan 2b 1208.33 1200.00 8.33 8.16 0 
Example D 
Current 500.00 500.00 0 0 0 
Plan 1 500.00 500.00 0 0 0 
Plan 2a 500.00 500.00 0 0 0 
Plan 2b 500.00 500.00 0 0 0 
Example E 
Current 375.00 0 375.00 111.54 0 
Plan 1 375.00 0 375.00 373.68 0 
Plan 2a 375.00 0 375.00 119.01 0 
Plan 2b 375.00 0 375.00 373.68 0 
Example F 
Current 1087.50 250.00 837.50 287.67 0 
Plan 1 1087.50 250.00 837.50 837.18 0 
Plan 2a 1087.50 250.00 837.50 304.41 •o 
Plan 2b 1087.50 250.00 837.50 837.18 0 
Example G 
Current 458.33 0 458.33 482.86 319.00 
Plan 1 1128.33 0 1128.33 1459.78 319.00 
Plan 2a 458.33 0 458.33 511.98 319.00 
Plan 2b 458.33 0 458 .11 1459.78 319.00 
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Excess Over- Over- (Under-) Marginal Calculated 
Withheld (Under-) Payment as% Tax Value Payments of Jan. Income Rate of k 
26.48 
33.29 91.71 40.73 38.52 
158.48 2.52 1.12 49.90 
36.80 .88:. 20 39.15 38.83 
158.40 ( 33.48) ( 14.87) 49.90 
1.53 
42.08 91.25 13.63 22.76 
1811.76 ( 25.43) ( 3.80) 49.98 
101.76 31.57 4.72 23.68 
1811.76 (1678.43) ( 250.78) 49.98 
36.00 
2.28 6.05 1.92 48.79 
8.16 0.17 0.05 49.96 
2.44 5.89 1.87 48.82 
8.16 0.17 0.05 49.96 
0 
0 0 0 50.00 
0 0 0 50.00 
0 0 0 50.00 
0 0 0 50.00 
35.21 
111.54 263.46 76.10 23.68 
373.68 1.32 0.38 49.87 
119.01 255.99 73.95 24.40 
.. 373 .68 1.32 0.38 49.87 
32.84 
287.67 549.83 77.18 27.09 
837.18 0.32 0.04 49.99 
304.41 
-
533.09 74.82 27.79 
837.18 0.32 0.04 49.99 
10.09 
163.86 294.47 44.89 26.77 
1140.78 ( 12.45) ( 1.90) 50.03 
192.98 265.35 40.45 27 .47 





















APPENDIX A - TABLE III 
REVIEW OF PLANS 


































































of Period n 







Examples Total Subsidy 




Plan 1-3 1200.00 
Plan 1-4 1200.00 
Plan 1-3a 1304.19 
Plan 1-4a 1304.19 
Plan 2a-3 1200.00 
Plan 2a-4 1200.00 
Plan 2a-3a 1203.42 
Plan 2a-4a 1203.42 
Plan 2b-3 1200.00 
Plan 2b-4· 1200.00 
Plan 2b-3a 1304.19 
Plan 2b-4a 1304.19 
APPENDIX A - TABLE IV 






















41.10 ( 41.10) 
41.10 ( 41.10) 
145.29 ( 145.29) 
145.29 ( 145.29) 
145.29 ( 41.10) 
145.29 ( 41.10) 
44.52 ( 44.52) 
44.52 ( 44.52) 
44.52 ( 41.10) 
44.52 ( 41.10) 
145.29 ( 145.29) 
145.29 ( 145.29) 
145.29 ( 41.10) 
145.29 ( 41.10) 
1Because the positive tax liability is zero the total amount with-
held will be equal to the excess withheld. 
Over- (Under-) 
Payment as% 
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